Jennifer Burns

And in some ways, this is completely obvious because so many banks... have failed. And we don't have any type of bank insurance at that point. So if your bank goes under, your savings are there, the money essentially vanishes. And it's fractional reserve banking, right? So you've put in, they can loan up to 90% on their deposits. And so Friedman and Schwartz present this argument

And in some ways, this is completely obvious because so many banks... have failed. And we don't have any type of bank insurance at that point. So if your bank goes under, your savings are there, the money essentially vanishes. And it's fractional reserve banking, right? So you've put in, they can loan up to 90% on their deposits. And so Friedman and Schwartz present this argument

that what really made the Great Depression so bad was this drop in the amount of money, the 30% drop in the money. They call it the Great Contraction. And then they go further and they say, well, how did this happen and why? And they... pinpoint the Federal Reserve, which is a fairly new institution at that time. And they say, what did the Federal Reserve do, the lender of last resort?

that what really made the Great Depression so bad was this drop in the amount of money, the 30% drop in the money. They call it the Great Contraction. And then they go further and they say, well, how did this happen and why? And they... pinpoint the Federal Reserve, which is a fairly new institution at that time. And they say, what did the Federal Reserve do, the lender of last resort?

that what really made the Great Depression so bad was this drop in the amount of money, the 30% drop in the money. They call it the Great Contraction. And then they go further and they say, well, how did this happen and why? And they... pinpoint the Federal Reserve, which is a fairly new institution at that time. And they say, what did the Federal Reserve do, the lender of last resort?

What did it do in the face of what they're depicting as a massive, unprecedented liquidity crisis? And they find it's not really doing much. And they really dig into the details. And they find that the Federal Reserve has gone through a sort of personnel change. And some of the key leaders in the 1920s, Benjamin Strong is one of them. He's now deceased.

What did it do in the face of what they're depicting as a massive, unprecedented liquidity crisis? And they find it's not really doing much. And they really dig into the details. And they find that the Federal Reserve has gone through a sort of personnel change. And some of the key leaders in the 1920s, Benjamin Strong is one of them. He's now deceased.

What did it do in the face of what they're depicting as a massive, unprecedented liquidity crisis? And they find it's not really doing much. And they really dig into the details. And they find that the Federal Reserve has gone through a sort of personnel change. And some of the key leaders in the 1920s, Benjamin Strong is one of them. He's now deceased.

And the dominance of the New York Federal Reserve, which in their telling, you know, is global. It's interconnected. It's seen a lot of financial things come and go. And they believe that the New York Fed had the understanding to recognize this is a liquidity crisis. We should be very generous. We should support all the banks.

And the dominance of the New York Federal Reserve, which in their telling, you know, is global. It's interconnected. It's seen a lot of financial things come and go. And they believe that the New York Fed had the understanding to recognize this is a liquidity crisis. We should be very generous. We should support all the banks.

And the dominance of the New York Federal Reserve, which in their telling, you know, is global. It's interconnected. It's seen a lot of financial things come and go. And they believe that the New York Fed had the understanding to recognize this is a liquidity crisis. We should be very generous. We should support all the banks.

Their influence has diminished for the kind of banks that are more conservative. They don't say like the Rubes and the Hicks, but it basically is. It's like the people in charge don't know what they're doing. And so the Fed pursues this kind of policy of masterly inactivity. They don't see it as a problem. They don't do much. There's an enormous liquidity crisis. And that's their...

Their influence has diminished for the kind of banks that are more conservative. They don't say like the Rubes and the Hicks, but it basically is. It's like the people in charge don't know what they're doing. And so the Fed pursues this kind of policy of masterly inactivity. They don't see it as a problem. They don't do much. There's an enormous liquidity crisis. And that's their...

Their influence has diminished for the kind of banks that are more conservative. They don't say like the Rubes and the Hicks, but it basically is. It's like the people in charge don't know what they're doing. And so the Fed pursues this kind of policy of masterly inactivity. They don't see it as a problem. They don't do much. There's an enormous liquidity crisis. And that's their...

version of what the Great Depression is all about, that it's a financial system meltdown, it's a liquidity crisis, and that it in some ways, well, in many ways, they argue very strong counterfactual argument. The Federal Reserve could have prevented it. and it did not. And so it becomes then an institutional failure and a political failure, not a failure of capitalism as a system.

version of what the Great Depression is all about, that it's a financial system meltdown, it's a liquidity crisis, and that it in some ways, well, in many ways, they argue very strong counterfactual argument. The Federal Reserve could have prevented it. and it did not. And so it becomes then an institutional failure and a political failure, not a failure of capitalism as a system.

version of what the Great Depression is all about, that it's a financial system meltdown, it's a liquidity crisis, and that it in some ways, well, in many ways, they argue very strong counterfactual argument. The Federal Reserve could have prevented it. and it did not. And so it becomes then an institutional failure and a political failure, not a failure of capitalism as a system.

And so this book comes out, it's a blockbuster, and even those economists who've been like, Friedman is a crank, I don't buy it, are like, Friedman and Schwartz are on to something. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz are on to something. And so that really changes the game.

And so this book comes out, it's a blockbuster, and even those economists who've been like, Friedman is a crank, I don't buy it, are like, Friedman and Schwartz are on to something. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz are on to something. And so that really changes the game.

And so this book comes out, it's a blockbuster, and even those economists who've been like, Friedman is a crank, I don't buy it, are like, Friedman and Schwartz are on to something. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz are on to something. And so that really changes the game.