Joe Carlsmith

This is a bad deal.

You're holding hostage your commitment to, to not being burned alive or like your care for that to this like abstruse, like basically your, your, um,

Yeah, like I think, I mean, I go through in the essay a bunch of different ways in which I think this is wrong, but I think just like, and I think these people who kind of pronounce, they're like moral realism or the void, like they don't actually think about bets like this.

I'm like, no, no, okay, so really, like, is that what you want to do?

And no, I think we should, I still care about my value, my sort of allegiance to my values, I think is kind of outstrips the, my like commitments to like various like meta-ethical interpretations of my values.

I think like we should,

the sense in which we like care about not being burned alive is much more solid than like our kind of, you know, than the reasoning and on what matters.

Okay, so that's like the sort of philosophical doom.

Now you could have this, it sounded like you were also gesturing at a sort of empirical doom.

Right.

Which is like, okay, dude, if it's all, if it's just going in a zillion directions,

come on, you think it's going to go in your direction?

Like, there's going to be so much churn.

Like, you're just going to lose.

And so, you know, you should give up now and kind of only fight for the realism worlds.

And there I'm like, I mean, so I think...

You know, you got to do the expected value calculation.

You got to, like, actually have a view about, like, how doomed are you in these different worlds?

What's the tractability of changing different worlds?

I mean, I'm quite skeptical of that.