Joe Carlsmith

But the thing, the thing I really don't want to do is write off the other worlds where it's not true.

Cause my guess is it's not true.

Right.

And I think stuff still matters a ton in, in those worlds too.

I'm not sure about that.

I'm not sure I, I, I'm not sure I do care about a notion of intellectual descendant in that sense.

Like if you imagine, I mean, literal paperclips is a human concept, right?

So, um, uh, I don't think any old, any old human concept will, will do, uh, for, uh, the thing, the thing we're excited about.

I think the stuff that I would be more interested in the possibility of getting for free are things like consciousness, pleasure, sort of other features of human cognition.

Like I think... So there are paper clippers and there are paper clippers, right?

So imagine if the paper clipper is like an unconscious...

kind of voracious machine.

It's just like, it appears to you as a cloud of paperclips, you know, but there's nothing sort of, that's like one vision.

If you imagine the paperclip is like a conscious being that like loves paperclips, right?

It like takes pleasure in making paperclips.

That's like a different vision

thing.

Right.

Um, and obviously it could still, it's not necessarily the case that like, you know, it makes the future all paper clippy is probably not optimizing for consciousness or pleasure.

Right.