John Van Reenen

But then if you drill down into it, it is pretty fragmented. Each local general practitioner unit is self-employed. Each trust has a lot of autonomy. And that's part of the issue, is that this was a centralized, top-down program in a system where there's a lot of different fiefdoms, a lot of different pockets of power who are quite capable of resisting this.

and disliked very strongly being told this is what you're going to have, this is what you're going to do without really being engaged and consulted properly.

and disliked very strongly being told this is what you're going to have, this is what you're going to do without really being engaged and consulted properly.

and disliked very strongly being told this is what you're going to have, this is what you're going to do without really being engaged and consulted properly.

And the delivery of those was, it was a guy called Richard Granger who was brought in, I think he was the highest paid public servant in the country. He was at Deloitte's before he came and then after he left he went to work for Accenture. He was brought in to do this and he designed these contracts

And the delivery of those was, it was a guy called Richard Granger who was brought in, I think he was the highest paid public servant in the country. He was at Deloitte's before he came and then after he left he went to work for Accenture. He was brought in to do this and he designed these contracts

And the delivery of those was, it was a guy called Richard Granger who was brought in, I think he was the highest paid public servant in the country. He was at Deloitte's before he came and then after he left he went to work for Accenture. He was brought in to do this and he designed these contracts

Very tough contracts, which loaded the risk of things going wrong very strongly onto the private sector providers. I think just about every single quote-unquote winner eventually either went bankrupt or walked away from the contract. The estimates vary of the cost of this, but estimates are up to $20 billion lost on this project. It was the biggest civilian IT project in the Western world.

Very tough contracts, which loaded the risk of things going wrong very strongly onto the private sector providers. I think just about every single quote-unquote winner eventually either went bankrupt or walked away from the contract. The estimates vary of the cost of this, but estimates are up to $20 billion lost on this project. It was the biggest civilian IT project in the Western world.

Very tough contracts, which loaded the risk of things going wrong very strongly onto the private sector providers. I think just about every single quote-unquote winner eventually either went bankrupt or walked away from the contract. The estimates vary of the cost of this, but estimates are up to $20 billion lost on this project. It was the biggest civilian IT project in the Western world.

I mean, there's lots of examples of huge public sector failures and private sector failures as well, but this was one of the biggest.

I mean, there's lots of examples of huge public sector failures and private sector failures as well, but this was one of the biggest.

I mean, there's lots of examples of huge public sector failures and private sector failures as well, but this was one of the biggest.

I think it's a failure of many, many different causes on many different levels. That top-downness, not really understanding what was going on at a grassroots level, and the haste, it was attempted on very quickly.

I think it's a failure of many, many different causes on many different levels. That top-downness, not really understanding what was going on at a grassroots level, and the haste, it was attempted on very quickly.

I think it's a failure of many, many different causes on many different levels. That top-downness, not really understanding what was going on at a grassroots level, and the haste, it was attempted on very quickly.

Correct. I mean, it seemed at the time when these contracts were formed, the government was getting a good deal. They were doing it quickly. They were loading the risks onto the suppliers. So it wasn't obvious from the get-go that this was going to be as bad as it turned out to be.

Correct. I mean, it seemed at the time when these contracts were formed, the government was getting a good deal. They were doing it quickly. They were loading the risks onto the suppliers. So it wasn't obvious from the get-go that this was going to be as bad as it turned out to be.

Correct. I mean, it seemed at the time when these contracts were formed, the government was getting a good deal. They were doing it quickly. They were loading the risks onto the suppliers. So it wasn't obvious from the get-go that this was going to be as bad as it turned out to be.

Looking back, trying to do things quickly in such a complicated system, there was so much complexity that a lot of these contracts effectively had to be rewritten afterwards. And I think another general lesson is that when you're doing a long-term, important big contract, you can't get everything written down quickly. There has to be a lot of give and take.