Kate Shaw
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Podcast Appearances
Or can you imagine the Supreme Court deciding to expand the immunity it announces in this opinion to encompass top advisors, say?
of government. It's like, no, he's not. There are two million people in a branch of government. He is enormously important. And I don't think either of us wants to discount presidential power. I actually really do think a powerful presidency is a part of our constitutional tradition, at least now, maybe not from its inception.
of government. It's like, no, he's not. There are two million people in a branch of government. He is enormously important. And I don't think either of us wants to discount presidential power. I actually really do think a powerful presidency is a part of our constitutional tradition, at least now, maybe not from its inception.
But the idea that he is a branch of government, which is it just seems like you said, is it is it oblivious or is it hostile to the reality of what the executive branch really looks like?
But the idea that he is a branch of government, which is it just seems like you said, is it is it oblivious or is it hostile to the reality of what the executive branch really looks like?
So, but even if down the road you can imagine this line of thinking resulting in such an expansion, as we sit here, I think it would be rash if I were advising the future president's underlings to assume that they're necessarily going to enjoy the same scope of immunity that the court announces as to the president personally.
So, but even if down the road you can imagine this line of thinking resulting in such an expansion, as we sit here, I think it would be rash if I were advising the future president's underlings to assume that they're necessarily going to enjoy the same scope of immunity that the court announces as to the president personally.
I think it's such an important point. And there were so many examples from the first Trump term of the possibility of criminal exposure actually operating as this kind of important tool that Trump advisers use to resist some of Trump's most extreme threats. directives or instincts on the grounds of potential future criminal liability, right?
I think it's such an important point. And there were so many examples from the first Trump term of the possibility of criminal exposure actually operating as this kind of important tool that Trump advisers use to resist some of Trump's most extreme threats. directives or instincts on the grounds of potential future criminal liability, right?
Like, think about former White House counsel Don McGahn, who told investigators that he resisted Trump's entreaties to get him to direct special counsel Robert Mueller's firing on the grounds, according to McGahn himself, that if Trump removed Mueller or interfered with the investigation... that action would be used to accuse the president of obstruction of justice.
Like, think about former White House counsel Don McGahn, who told investigators that he resisted Trump's entreaties to get him to direct special counsel Robert Mueller's firing on the grounds, according to McGahn himself, that if Trump removed Mueller or interfered with the investigation... that action would be used to accuse the president of obstruction of justice.
It is very hard after the immunity decision to see how a future White House counsel makes those same arguments to a president determined to push or transgress the boundaries of the law.
It is very hard after the immunity decision to see how a future White House counsel makes those same arguments to a president determined to push or transgress the boundaries of the law.
So that's a really good segue to the next topic I wanted to turn to. And that is to kind of take this question of presidential control and control over personnel and firing specifically to talk about the FBI director. OK, so last week, FBI Director Christopher Wray said that he would resign at the end of the Biden administration.
So that's a really good segue to the next topic I wanted to turn to. And that is to kind of take this question of presidential control and control over personnel and firing specifically to talk about the FBI director. OK, so last week, FBI Director Christopher Wray said that he would resign at the end of the Biden administration.
Trump had made it very clear during his campaign that he wanted Wray gone. But there was some question about whether he would and maybe whether he could fire Wray outright. The FBI director is one of a few presidential appointees whose position is designed to be held for a term of years, in his case, 10 years. So these are not people who just serve at the pleasure of the president.
Trump had made it very clear during his campaign that he wanted Wray gone. But there was some question about whether he would and maybe whether he could fire Wray outright. The FBI director is one of a few presidential appointees whose position is designed to be held for a term of years, in his case, 10 years. So these are not people who just serve at the pleasure of the president.
They're actually meant to be in their position for a set period. Now, there's nothing in the statute that says the president has to provide a good reason before firing the FBI director. But the 10-year term, the legislative history, and consistent practice make clear that one of the goals in creating this 10-year term was to insulate the FBI director from the president.
They're actually meant to be in their position for a set period. Now, there's nothing in the statute that says the president has to provide a good reason before firing the FBI director. But the 10-year term, the legislative history, and consistent practice make clear that one of the goals in creating this 10-year term was to insulate the FBI director from the president.
So, OK, the question of Wray getting fired is now moot, but the question remains as to other officials, members of what we think of as independent agencies like the Federal Trade Commission or the Federal Reserve, who both by tradition and by law have more independence from the president than, say, the secretary of defense or another member of the cabinet.