Kate Shaw

procedures to tell them to follow and also pass substantive statutes that tell them to do things, identify endangered species, ensure workplace safety, right? Obviously, the list is infinitely long. So, court big winner, Congress big loser. Do we know yet, I guess, about agencies and what about the president?

So we have been talking through a number of trends involving pretty radical transformation of legal rules. So we have an ascendant president with few checks, a disempowered or reconfigured administrative state, a hugely powerful Supreme Court sitting atop all of that. And I want to drill down a bit more on this Supreme Court, but first I would like to dip a bit into history.

So we have been talking through a number of trends involving pretty radical transformation of legal rules. So we have an ascendant president with few checks, a disempowered or reconfigured administrative state, a hugely powerful Supreme Court sitting atop all of that. And I want to drill down a bit more on this Supreme Court, but first I would like to dip a bit into history.

So you have written about the parallels between this anti-administrative, anti-regulatory Supreme Court and the anti-administrative, anti-regulatory court of the 1930s. Can you tell us a little bit about the court of the 1930s?

So you have written about the parallels between this anti-administrative, anti-regulatory Supreme Court and the anti-administrative, anti-regulatory court of the 1930s. Can you tell us a little bit about the court of the 1930s?

So by 1937, the court has largely reconciled itself to the constitutionality writ large of things called administrative agencies and some version of an administrative state. But before that, in, you know, maybe 1935, the high watermark for Supreme Court hostility to the New Deal— I guess, how does that court and its radicalism compare to today's Supreme Court and its radicalism?

So by 1937, the court has largely reconciled itself to the constitutionality writ large of things called administrative agencies and some version of an administrative state. But before that, in, you know, maybe 1935, the high watermark for Supreme Court hostility to the New Deal— I guess, how does that court and its radicalism compare to today's Supreme Court and its radicalism?

So I think that prose is woven throughout a lot of recent Roberts Court decisions, that the administrative state is in some sense an existential threat to liberty. And you have argued that this Supreme Court often fails to appreciate the ways that agencies, that the administrative state actually protects liberty. So can you say a little bit about that?

So I think that prose is woven throughout a lot of recent Roberts Court decisions, that the administrative state is in some sense an existential threat to liberty. And you have argued that this Supreme Court often fails to appreciate the ways that agencies, that the administrative state actually protects liberty. So can you say a little bit about that?

Yeah, but I do think that this court holds a very, very narrow conception of liberty. So you're referring to the kinds of positive liberty government might pursue, environmental protection, consumer welfare, racial justice, gender justice. And if this court does not imagine those as encompassed within its conception of liberty— And I think it doesn't.

Yeah, but I do think that this court holds a very, very narrow conception of liberty. So you're referring to the kinds of positive liberty government might pursue, environmental protection, consumer welfare, racial justice, gender justice. And if this court does not imagine those as encompassed within its conception of liberty— And I think it doesn't.

I guess it's not surprising that it's deeply hostile to agencies' pursuit of those kinds of projects. Because I don't think it's a random list of agencies that the court has demonstrated its hostility towards. It seems to be the agencies, in particular in the kind of consumer protection and consumer welfare space, where it seems very, very skeptical of agency authority.

I guess it's not surprising that it's deeply hostile to agencies' pursuit of those kinds of projects. Because I don't think it's a random list of agencies that the court has demonstrated its hostility towards. It seems to be the agencies, in particular in the kind of consumer protection and consumer welfare space, where it seems very, very skeptical of agency authority.

And the court somewhat gets the cases served up to it. But the hostility is not consistent across all of the different kinds of tasks that government performs.

And the court somewhat gets the cases served up to it. But the hostility is not consistent across all of the different kinds of tasks that government performs.

So you do view all of these moves, we've been talking about them in somewhat disparate ways, as part of an ideologically unified project.

So you do view all of these moves, we've been talking about them in somewhat disparate ways, as part of an ideologically unified project.

We hear the phrase the administrative state a lot. And I think a lot of the time it's used almost as a pejorative, right? Like by people who don't like the administrative state. It sounds maybe kind of ominous, maybe like it's not part of the government. It's like some other thing. So I want to give you a chance to offer a corrective. How do you understand what the administrative state is?

We hear the phrase the administrative state a lot. And I think a lot of the time it's used almost as a pejorative, right? Like by people who don't like the administrative state. It sounds maybe kind of ominous, maybe like it's not part of the government. It's like some other thing. So I want to give you a chance to offer a corrective. How do you understand what the administrative state is?

Who is the kind of standard bearer for this war on the administrative state on the current court in your view?