Lee Cronin

If I give you the coordinates of an object moving in space and the coordinates of another object and they collide in space, and you know those initial conditions, you should know exactly what's going to happen. However... you cannot specify these coordinates to infinite precision. Now everyone said, you know, oh, this is kind of like, you know, the chaos theory argument.

No, no, it's deeper than that. Here's a problem with numbers. This is where Hilbert and Brouwer fell out. To have the coordinates of this object, a given object, as they're colliding, you have to have them to infinite precision. That's what Hilbert says. He says, no problem, infinite precision is fine. Let's just take that for granted. But when the object...

No, no, it's deeper than that. Here's a problem with numbers. This is where Hilbert and Brouwer fell out. To have the coordinates of this object, a given object, as they're colliding, you have to have them to infinite precision. That's what Hilbert says. He says, no problem, infinite precision is fine. Let's just take that for granted. But when the object...

No, no, it's deeper than that. Here's a problem with numbers. This is where Hilbert and Brouwer fell out. To have the coordinates of this object, a given object, as they're colliding, you have to have them to infinite precision. That's what Hilbert says. He says, no problem, infinite precision is fine. Let's just take that for granted. But when the object...

It's finite and it can't store its own coordinates. What do you do? So in principle, if a finite object cannot be specified to infinite precision, in principle, the initial conditions don't apply. Well, how do you know it can't store its... Well, how do you store an infinitely long number in a finite size? Well...

It's finite and it can't store its own coordinates. What do you do? So in principle, if a finite object cannot be specified to infinite precision, in principle, the initial conditions don't apply. Well, how do you know it can't store its... Well, how do you store an infinitely long number in a finite size? Well...

It's finite and it can't store its own coordinates. What do you do? So in principle, if a finite object cannot be specified to infinite precision, in principle, the initial conditions don't apply. Well, how do you know it can't store its... Well, how do you store an infinitely long number in a finite size? Well...

No, no.

No, no.

No, no.

Well, let's take the object. Let's say the object is a golf ball. Golf ball is a few centimeters in diameter. We can work out how many atoms are on the golf ball. And let's say we can store numbers down to atomic dislocations. So we can work out how many atoms there are in the golf ball, and we can store the coordinates in that golf ball down to that number. But beyond that, we can't.

Well, let's take the object. Let's say the object is a golf ball. Golf ball is a few centimeters in diameter. We can work out how many atoms are on the golf ball. And let's say we can store numbers down to atomic dislocations. So we can work out how many atoms there are in the golf ball, and we can store the coordinates in that golf ball down to that number. But beyond that, we can't.

Well, let's take the object. Let's say the object is a golf ball. Golf ball is a few centimeters in diameter. We can work out how many atoms are on the golf ball. And let's say we can store numbers down to atomic dislocations. So we can work out how many atoms there are in the golf ball, and we can store the coordinates in that golf ball down to that number. But beyond that, we can't.

Let's make the golf ball smaller. And this is where I think that we think that we get randomness in quantum mechanics. And some people say, you can't get randomness in quantum mechanics to be deterministic. But aha, this is where we realize that classical mechanics and quantum mechanics suffer from the same uncertainty principle.

Let's make the golf ball smaller. And this is where I think that we think that we get randomness in quantum mechanics. And some people say, you can't get randomness in quantum mechanics to be deterministic. But aha, this is where we realize that classical mechanics and quantum mechanics suffer from the same uncertainty principle.

Let's make the golf ball smaller. And this is where I think that we think that we get randomness in quantum mechanics. And some people say, you can't get randomness in quantum mechanics to be deterministic. But aha, this is where we realize that classical mechanics and quantum mechanics suffer from the same uncertainty principle.

And that is the inability to specify the initial conditions to a precise enough degree to give you determinism. The universe is intrinsically too big, and that's why time exists. It's non-deterministic. Looking back into the past, you can use logical arguments because you can say, was it true or false? You already know.

And that is the inability to specify the initial conditions to a precise enough degree to give you determinism. The universe is intrinsically too big, and that's why time exists. It's non-deterministic. Looking back into the past, you can use logical arguments because you can say, was it true or false? You already know.

And that is the inability to specify the initial conditions to a precise enough degree to give you determinism. The universe is intrinsically too big, and that's why time exists. It's non-deterministic. Looking back into the past, you can use logical arguments because you can say, was it true or false? You already know.

But the fact we are unable to predict the future with the precision is not evidence of lack of knowledge. It's evidence the universe is generating new things.