Maria Bartiromo

Like, I want to be part of it. I've drunk the Kool-Aid. I believe wholeheartedly in what we're trying to do and wanting to make it better. And so many of my colleagues want to do the same, including our director general, including Mike Ryan. But there is criticisms of us. I mean, one of the things learning, and we're criticized of this, of, like, not acting fast enough.

I mean, one of the lessons you learn every single time is to act fast. And I have to say, you know, this is one of the criticisms I find the most strange. Could we have done more? Absolutely. Could we have done better? Absolutely. There's no other answer to that question. But in terms of acting fast, what we were able to do is from that first

I mean, one of the lessons you learn every single time is to act fast. And I have to say, you know, this is one of the criticisms I find the most strange. Could we have done more? Absolutely. Could we have done better? Absolutely. There's no other answer to that question. But in terms of acting fast, what we were able to do is from that first

I mean, one of the lessons you learn every single time is to act fast. And I have to say, you know, this is one of the criticisms I find the most strange. Could we have done more? Absolutely. Could we have done better? Absolutely. There's no other answer to that question. But in terms of acting fast, what we were able to do is from that first

instance of this cluster of pneumonia of unknown etiology, we activated what we call our emergency response framework. We do this for every outbreak, whether it's a big signal or it's a small signal. We knew right away something was wrong. A cluster of 27, no health workers involved.

instance of this cluster of pneumonia of unknown etiology, we activated what we call our emergency response framework. We do this for every outbreak, whether it's a big signal or it's a small signal. We knew right away something was wrong. A cluster of 27, no health workers involved.

instance of this cluster of pneumonia of unknown etiology, we activated what we call our emergency response framework. We do this for every outbreak, whether it's a big signal or it's a small signal. We knew right away something was wrong. A cluster of 27, no health workers involved.

We didn't know the cause in a country that has very strong lab surveillance, meaning it's not flu, it's not MERS, it's not SARS, it's not adenovirus, it's not Legionella, it's not, not, not, right? What is it? I immediately thought coronavirus because that's my background, but that's just, you know, what we, but immediately red flags. We set up an incident management team.

We didn't know the cause in a country that has very strong lab surveillance, meaning it's not flu, it's not MERS, it's not SARS, it's not adenovirus, it's not Legionella, it's not, not, not, right? What is it? I immediately thought coronavirus because that's my background, but that's just, you know, what we, but immediately red flags. We set up an incident management team.

We didn't know the cause in a country that has very strong lab surveillance, meaning it's not flu, it's not MERS, it's not SARS, it's not adenovirus, it's not Legionella, it's not, not, not, right? What is it? I immediately thought coronavirus because that's my background, but that's just, you know, what we, but immediately red flags. We set up an incident management team.

We informed our member states through our closed system. And then we informed publicly. We issued a package of guidance, technical guidance within two weeks. The 9th of January to the 12th of January issued guidance. The sequence was shared around the 9th, 10th, 11th, depending on the day, depending on the, you know, the source of that. But the first PCR test,

We informed our member states through our closed system. And then we informed publicly. We issued a package of guidance, technical guidance within two weeks. The 9th of January to the 12th of January issued guidance. The sequence was shared around the 9th, 10th, 11th, depending on the day, depending on the, you know, the source of that. But the first PCR test,

We informed our member states through our closed system. And then we informed publicly. We issued a package of guidance, technical guidance within two weeks. The 9th of January to the 12th of January issued guidance. The sequence was shared around the 9th, 10th, 11th, depending on the day, depending on the, you know, the source of that. But the first PCR test,

was actually, the protocol was published on the 13th of January. And we started activating our systems. And we started warning the world. Now, the thing where I think we can improve, and I think this is coming through with the updated and amended international health regulations, and certainly from the pandemic accord that is being discussed, is the warnings that we can issue.

was actually, the protocol was published on the 13th of January. And we started activating our systems. And we started warning the world. Now, the thing where I think we can improve, and I think this is coming through with the updated and amended international health regulations, and certainly from the pandemic accord that is being discussed, is the warnings that we can issue.

was actually, the protocol was published on the 13th of January. And we started activating our systems. And we started warning the world. Now, the thing where I think we can improve, and I think this is coming through with the updated and amended international health regulations, and certainly from the pandemic accord that is being discussed, is the warnings that we can issue.

how loud that actual alarm is and how serious people take that. I mean, people arguably did not wake up to COVID until Lombardi was hit because it was some unknown pathogen in some faraway country. When Lombardi was hit, it was significant. When New York was hit, really people started to wake up and think, oh my gosh, this is here. And the hubris that we had of like, we could handle this.

how loud that actual alarm is and how serious people take that. I mean, people arguably did not wake up to COVID until Lombardi was hit because it was some unknown pathogen in some faraway country. When Lombardi was hit, it was significant. When New York was hit, really people started to wake up and think, oh my gosh, this is here. And the hubris that we had of like, we could handle this.

how loud that actual alarm is and how serious people take that. I mean, people arguably did not wake up to COVID until Lombardi was hit because it was some unknown pathogen in some faraway country. When Lombardi was hit, it was significant. When New York was hit, really people started to wake up and think, oh my gosh, this is here. And the hubris that we had of like, we could handle this.

I talked to health workers all over and you know this, you've treated patients, right? That anticipation of waiting for patients to arrive is So acting fast is one huge one. A second one is around using science as a foundation, but it's not the only important element, right? Data and knowledge and evidence-based guidance is very different than policies that are set.