Max Seddon

I think there's enough that's going on in Western society, West European society, where if you're Russia, you feel very much like the things that Vance talked about in Munich are going your way. If you think about The former Soviet and Soviet occupied countries, I think there is a bit of a difference there because it's more about how Russia perceives threats.

Georgia, they've basically sorted that out. You have this authoritarian, Moscow-friendly, in as much as any government in Georgia can be Moscow-friendly. They've done an effective job of suppressing opposition to drifting into the Russian embrace. There's no prospect of Georgia joining NATO. Moldova...

Georgia, they've basically sorted that out. You have this authoritarian, Moscow-friendly, in as much as any government in Georgia can be Moscow-friendly. They've done an effective job of suppressing opposition to drifting into the Russian embrace. There's no prospect of Georgia joining NATO. Moldova...

Georgia, they've basically sorted that out. You have this authoritarian, Moscow-friendly, in as much as any government in Georgia can be Moscow-friendly. They've done an effective job of suppressing opposition to drifting into the Russian embrace. There's no prospect of Georgia joining NATO. Moldova...

is more problematic for them to influence now, especially that's one consequence of the war, because Transnistria, the enclave with a small Russian troop deployment there is basically cut off now from Russia being able to influence it seriously and the government just about squeaked through the pro-EU referendum there.

is more problematic for them to influence now, especially that's one consequence of the war, because Transnistria, the enclave with a small Russian troop deployment there is basically cut off now from Russia being able to influence it seriously and the government just about squeaked through the pro-EU referendum there.

is more problematic for them to influence now, especially that's one consequence of the war, because Transnistria, the enclave with a small Russian troop deployment there is basically cut off now from Russia being able to influence it seriously and the government just about squeaked through the pro-EU referendum there.

But the real issue is the Baltics and not just the Baltics themselves, what the Baltics means about European security, because this is the absolute nightmare scenario if you are a NATO advocate, is that seeing how Trump feels about European security, which is basically, you know, you do it, you know, so much for the... American security umbrella that NATO is built on. Go deal with it yourselves.

But the real issue is the Baltics and not just the Baltics themselves, what the Baltics means about European security, because this is the absolute nightmare scenario if you are a NATO advocate, is that seeing how Trump feels about European security, which is basically, you know, you do it, you know, so much for the... American security umbrella that NATO is built on. Go deal with it yourselves.

But the real issue is the Baltics and not just the Baltics themselves, what the Baltics means about European security, because this is the absolute nightmare scenario if you are a NATO advocate, is that seeing how Trump feels about European security, which is basically, you know, you do it, you know, so much for the... American security umbrella that NATO is built on. Go deal with it yourselves.

K thanks, bye. And by the way, here's the bill. And what the scenario has always been is that you have these you have these NATO contingents in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. You have some cities that have quite large Russian-speaking populations where there is still, some of them do sympathize with Russia to some extent on the border, like Narva in Estonia, Dogovpils in Latvia.

K thanks, bye. And by the way, here's the bill. And what the scenario has always been is that you have these you have these NATO contingents in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. You have some cities that have quite large Russian-speaking populations where there is still, some of them do sympathize with Russia to some extent on the border, like Narva in Estonia, Dogovpils in Latvia.

K thanks, bye. And by the way, here's the bill. And what the scenario has always been is that you have these you have these NATO contingents in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. You have some cities that have quite large Russian-speaking populations where there is still, some of them do sympathize with Russia to some extent on the border, like Narva in Estonia, Dogovpils in Latvia.

And you try something there and some sort of limited incursion doesn't have to be some big invasion. I don't think Putin is interested in the Baltics the way that he is in certainly not Ukraine or even the Caucasus and Central Asia. I remember a few months before the war, He said that the Soviet Union broke up into 12 states, not 15, leaving out the three Baltic states.

And you try something there and some sort of limited incursion doesn't have to be some big invasion. I don't think Putin is interested in the Baltics the way that he is in certainly not Ukraine or even the Caucasus and Central Asia. I remember a few months before the war, He said that the Soviet Union broke up into 12 states, not 15, leaving out the three Baltic states.

And you try something there and some sort of limited incursion doesn't have to be some big invasion. I don't think Putin is interested in the Baltics the way that he is in certainly not Ukraine or even the Caucasus and Central Asia. I remember a few months before the war, He said that the Soviet Union broke up into 12 states, not 15, leaving out the three Baltic states.

And an Estonian expert I know texted me in that moment and said, phew, thank God. But what they are important for is using them to undermine NATO. Because if the United States doesn't respond in any kind of serious way, That essentially shows that Article 5, the collective defense clause of NATO, you know, attack on one members and attack on all, that shows that it's essentially paper tiger.

And an Estonian expert I know texted me in that moment and said, phew, thank God. But what they are important for is using them to undermine NATO. Because if the United States doesn't respond in any kind of serious way, That essentially shows that Article 5, the collective defense clause of NATO, you know, attack on one members and attack on all, that shows that it's essentially paper tiger.

And an Estonian expert I know texted me in that moment and said, phew, thank God. But what they are important for is using them to undermine NATO. Because if the United States doesn't respond in any kind of serious way, That essentially shows that Article 5, the collective defense clause of NATO, you know, attack on one members and attack on all, that shows that it's essentially paper tiger.

It amounts for nothing. And, you know, Putin could feel that he's essentially dealt with the NATO problem once and for all. And, you know, that is the scary problem. I think, you know, not that he wants to. You get these really extreme people in the Russian system like Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechen dictator or people like that. who say, yeah, we want to drive to Poland on tanks.