Michael Weiss

But it certainly looks to me and to Middle East watchers like where things are headed with respect to Iran's nuclear file is JCPOA 2.0.

But it certainly looks to me and to Middle East watchers like where things are headed with respect to Iran's nuclear file is JCPOA 2.0.

Yeah, I mean, I can only imagine like the group therapy bills being sustained by AIPAC and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the guys have been like angling for maximum pressure.

Yeah, I mean, I can only imagine like the group therapy bills being sustained by AIPAC and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the guys have been like angling for maximum pressure.

Yeah, I mean, I can only imagine like the group therapy bills being sustained by AIPAC and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the guys have been like angling for maximum pressure.

Yeah, and the Iranians are dangling hundreds of billions of dollars, if not trillions of dollars of trade deals that could commence with the lifting of Iran sanctions, which they're hoping that will happen if they cut a deal. I could see how optically people would say this is the end of the neocon world order, but let's look at the other side of the ledger.

Yeah, and the Iranians are dangling hundreds of billions of dollars, if not trillions of dollars of trade deals that could commence with the lifting of Iran sanctions, which they're hoping that will happen if they cut a deal. I could see how optically people would say this is the end of the neocon world order, but let's look at the other side of the ledger.

Yeah, and the Iranians are dangling hundreds of billions of dollars, if not trillions of dollars of trade deals that could commence with the lifting of Iran sanctions, which they're hoping that will happen if they cut a deal. I could see how optically people would say this is the end of the neocon world order, but let's look at the other side of the ledger.

It was Obama and the progressive realists who said, Well, actually, you know... taking out Bashar al-Assad would be a major own goal. We don't have any strategic interest in Syria. We want to recalibrate with Iran. In other words, create a kind of equilibrium between the Shia hegemon in the region and the Sunni-led Gulf Arab states, principally Saudi Arabia.

It was Obama and the progressive realists who said, Well, actually, you know... taking out Bashar al-Assad would be a major own goal. We don't have any strategic interest in Syria. We want to recalibrate with Iran. In other words, create a kind of equilibrium between the Shia hegemon in the region and the Sunni-led Gulf Arab states, principally Saudi Arabia.

It was Obama and the progressive realists who said, Well, actually, you know... taking out Bashar al-Assad would be a major own goal. We don't have any strategic interest in Syria. We want to recalibrate with Iran. In other words, create a kind of equilibrium between the Shia hegemon in the region and the Sunni-led Gulf Arab states, principally Saudi Arabia.

I mean, Obama was on record with Jeffrey Goldberg and others saying pretty much that, a strategic realignment of America's priorities in the region. But Syria was always kind of the... obstacle to this, right? Like we kind of supported a Syrian insurgency, but didn't give them enough weapons and certainly didn't support them to overthrow the regime.

I mean, Obama was on record with Jeffrey Goldberg and others saying pretty much that, a strategic realignment of America's priorities in the region. But Syria was always kind of the... obstacle to this, right? Like we kind of supported a Syrian insurgency, but didn't give them enough weapons and certainly didn't support them to overthrow the regime.

I mean, Obama was on record with Jeffrey Goldberg and others saying pretty much that, a strategic realignment of America's priorities in the region. But Syria was always kind of the... obstacle to this, right? Like we kind of supported a Syrian insurgency, but didn't give them enough weapons and certainly didn't support them to overthrow the regime.

We wanted to apply a sufficient amount of pressure to get Bashar al-Assad to negotiate his removal, but really the fundamentals of his Baathist regime would stay in place. And up until the end of the Biden administration. I mean, Brett McGurk was the biggest, most vocal proponent of keeping Assad in place, lifting sanctions on Assad's regime.

We wanted to apply a sufficient amount of pressure to get Bashar al-Assad to negotiate his removal, but really the fundamentals of his Baathist regime would stay in place. And up until the end of the Biden administration. I mean, Brett McGurk was the biggest, most vocal proponent of keeping Assad in place, lifting sanctions on Assad's regime.

We wanted to apply a sufficient amount of pressure to get Bashar al-Assad to negotiate his removal, but really the fundamentals of his Baathist regime would stay in place. And up until the end of the Biden administration. I mean, Brett McGurk was the biggest, most vocal proponent of keeping Assad in place, lifting sanctions on Assad's regime.

That was something he wanted to do because the Emiratis were pushing him and other Gulf Arab states. It looked like Assad was coming in from the cold. There was going to be full rapprochement. And what happened? Well, we've discussed this on a previous program. The Turks said,

That was something he wanted to do because the Emiratis were pushing him and other Gulf Arab states. It looked like Assad was coming in from the cold. There was going to be full rapprochement. And what happened? Well, we've discussed this on a previous program. The Turks said,

That was something he wanted to do because the Emiratis were pushing him and other Gulf Arab states. It looked like Assad was coming in from the cold. There was going to be full rapprochement. And what happened? Well, we've discussed this on a previous program. The Turks said,