Michal Meidan

So if the US does cancel or a pro-US administration in Venezuela cancels these massive contracts, that's a huge loss of face for Beijing.

I mean, does Xi Jinping still roll out the red carpet for Trump in April?

How does that work with, you know, the very hard won stabilization so far of U.S.-China relations?

I think there is.

I mean, if you probably do speak to Chinese counterparts and look, they're hugely anxious about the future of their investments.

I think it was also reported that the policy banks were asked to assess their exposure.

And we've seen this before, right, after Iraq and after Libya.

that everybody was busy trying to figure out, you know, where their exposure is and review their risk assessment practices.

I think it is a big risk.

And I think for the Chinese stakeholders, there's a question of how do you double down on some of these assets?

Because

These are big, critical, important markets that have a geopolitical significance.

But how do you hedge against the bigger vulnerabilities?

I don't think they're going to divest or withdraw their assets.

These are big and important contracts.

But equally, they'll want to try and secure them.

Now, does that mean diversifying the equity market?

Having local partners, maybe having some Russian partners, making them look slightly less Chinese, maybe less debt, more cash, more RMB.

I know that there's a lot of concern about, I guess it's sort of the trading architecture, sort of what happens to currencies of trade, what happens to the technologies of trade.

I think that's a really big focus.