Mike Ritland

John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare that trains our special operations folks and the whole Fort Bragg-JFK special relationship during his presidency. But just two weeks after that historic October 21, 1961 Green Beret Special Forces event, JFK created USAID, and just one month later,

John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare that trains our special operations folks and the whole Fort Bragg-JFK special relationship during his presidency. But just two weeks after that historic October 21, 1961 Green Beret Special Forces event, JFK created USAID, and just one month later,

launched Operation Pincushion, which sent the Green Berets, sent our special forces to Laos, where USAID was, you know, it would later turn out, USAID very quickly played this function of supporting these very same CIA-backed mercenary groups that Operation Pinkush was recruiting.

launched Operation Pincushion, which sent the Green Berets, sent our special forces to Laos, where USAID was, you know, it would later turn out, USAID very quickly played this function of supporting these very same CIA-backed mercenary groups that Operation Pinkush was recruiting.

launched Operation Pincushion, which sent the Green Berets, sent our special forces to Laos, where USAID was, you know, it would later turn out, USAID very quickly played this function of supporting these very same CIA-backed mercenary groups that Operation Pinkush was recruiting.

They were sent to Laos by JFK to train and recruit these hillside guerrillas in Laos as part of our Southeast Asia, Vietnam-connected sub-war, unconventional warfare effort. We sent the special forces there to recruit them. The CIA managed that CIA mercenary army. And it was USAID who paid the head of that mercenary army to acquire two... U.S.

They were sent to Laos by JFK to train and recruit these hillside guerrillas in Laos as part of our Southeast Asia, Vietnam-connected sub-war, unconventional warfare effort. We sent the special forces there to recruit them. The CIA managed that CIA mercenary army. And it was USAID who paid the head of that mercenary army to acquire two... U.S.

They were sent to Laos by JFK to train and recruit these hillside guerrillas in Laos as part of our Southeast Asia, Vietnam-connected sub-war, unconventional warfare effort. We sent the special forces there to recruit them. The CIA managed that CIA mercenary army. And it was USAID who paid the head of that mercenary army to acquire two... U.S.

aircraft from two CIA proprietary airlines, Air America and Continental Air Services, everyone can look this up, in order to buy the planes that they use to traffic it's unseemly, but illegal narcotics to fund that war effort, as well as humanitarian relief supplies and personnel.

aircraft from two CIA proprietary airlines, Air America and Continental Air Services, everyone can look this up, in order to buy the planes that they use to traffic it's unseemly, but illegal narcotics to fund that war effort, as well as humanitarian relief supplies and personnel.

aircraft from two CIA proprietary airlines, Air America and Continental Air Services, everyone can look this up, in order to buy the planes that they use to traffic it's unseemly, but illegal narcotics to fund that war effort, as well as humanitarian relief supplies and personnel.

So USAID has played this swing role between state, CIA, and DOD and special forces work practically from the day it was born. But what's unique here is it's get out of White House approval free card. Can I flush this out for a second? Mm-hmm. Most of the major CIA scandals of the past two decades have not actually been the CIA directly themselves.

So USAID has played this swing role between state, CIA, and DOD and special forces work practically from the day it was born. But what's unique here is it's get out of White House approval free card. Can I flush this out for a second? Mm-hmm. Most of the major CIA scandals of the past two decades have not actually been the CIA directly themselves.

So USAID has played this swing role between state, CIA, and DOD and special forces work practically from the day it was born. But what's unique here is it's get out of White House approval free card. Can I flush this out for a second? Mm-hmm. Most of the major CIA scandals of the past two decades have not actually been the CIA directly themselves.

In 1993, USAID created this new office to help wage the post-Cold War political warfare, initially in Eastern Europe, after we were trying to create political vassal states out of the former Soviet colonies in Eastern Europe. And this was called the Office of Transition Initiatives, OTI, USAID OTI.

In 1993, USAID created this new office to help wage the post-Cold War political warfare, initially in Eastern Europe, after we were trying to create political vassal states out of the former Soviet colonies in Eastern Europe. And this was called the Office of Transition Initiatives, OTI, USAID OTI.

In 1993, USAID created this new office to help wage the post-Cold War political warfare, initially in Eastern Europe, after we were trying to create political vassal states out of the former Soviet colonies in Eastern Europe. And this was called the Office of Transition Initiatives, OTI, USAID OTI.

And it was designed to be a fast, flexible, rapid response capacity for USAID to do regime change work, to do political stabilization, to basically do sort of a kind of civilian special forces for civil, military, and political warfare work that would not have to run the traditional traps of approval. It wouldn't be bogged down in bureaucratic red tape.

And it was designed to be a fast, flexible, rapid response capacity for USAID to do regime change work, to do political stabilization, to basically do sort of a kind of civilian special forces for civil, military, and political warfare work that would not have to run the traditional traps of approval. It wouldn't be bogged down in bureaucratic red tape.

And it was designed to be a fast, flexible, rapid response capacity for USAID to do regime change work, to do political stabilization, to basically do sort of a kind of civilian special forces for civil, military, and political warfare work that would not have to run the traditional traps of approval. It wouldn't be bogged down in bureaucratic red tape.