Mouin Rabbani

Hussein Ara, yes, who was not at Camp David. But in response to your question, I think there could have been real possibility of Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace in the mid-1970s in the wake of the 1973 October War. I'll recall that in 1971,

Moshe Dayan, Israel's defense minister at the time, full of triumphalism about Israel's victory in 1967, speaking to a group of Israeli military veterans stated, if I had to choose between Sharm el-Sheikh without peace or peace without Sharm el-Sheikh, this is referring to the resort

Moshe Dayan, Israel's defense minister at the time, full of triumphalism about Israel's victory in 1967, speaking to a group of Israeli military veterans stated, if I had to choose between Sharm el-Sheikh without peace or peace without Sharm el-Sheikh, this is referring to the resort

Moshe Dayan, Israel's defense minister at the time, full of triumphalism about Israel's victory in 1967, speaking to a group of Israeli military veterans stated, if I had to choose between Sharm el-Sheikh without peace or peace without Sharm el-Sheikh, this is referring to the resort

in Egyptian Sinai, which was then under Israeli occupation, Dayan said, I will choose for Sharm el-Sheikh without peace. Then the 1973 war came along, and I think Israeli calculations began to change very significantly. And I think it was in that context that had there been a joint agreement

in Egyptian Sinai, which was then under Israeli occupation, Dayan said, I will choose for Sharm el-Sheikh without peace. Then the 1973 war came along, and I think Israeli calculations began to change very significantly. And I think it was in that context that had there been a joint agreement

in Egyptian Sinai, which was then under Israeli occupation, Dayan said, I will choose for Sharm el-Sheikh without peace. Then the 1973 war came along, and I think Israeli calculations began to change very significantly. And I think it was in that context that had there been a joint agreement

US-Soviet push for an Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian resolution that incorporated both an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state in in the occupied territories. I think there was a very reasonable prospect for that being achieved. It ended up being aborted, I think, for several reasons. And ultimately, the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, decided

US-Soviet push for an Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian resolution that incorporated both an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state in in the occupied territories. I think there was a very reasonable prospect for that being achieved. It ended up being aborted, I think, for several reasons. And ultimately, the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, decided

US-Soviet push for an Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian resolution that incorporated both an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state in in the occupied territories. I think there was a very reasonable prospect for that being achieved. It ended up being aborted, I think, for several reasons. And ultimately, the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, decided

for reasons we can discuss later, to launch a separate unilateral initiative for Israeli-Egyptian rather than Arab-Israeli peace. And I think once that set in motion, the prospects disappeared because Israel essentially saw its most powerful adversary removed from the equation and felt that this would give it a free hand

for reasons we can discuss later, to launch a separate unilateral initiative for Israeli-Egyptian rather than Arab-Israeli peace. And I think once that set in motion, the prospects disappeared because Israel essentially saw its most powerful adversary removed from the equation and felt that this would give it a free hand

for reasons we can discuss later, to launch a separate unilateral initiative for Israeli-Egyptian rather than Arab-Israeli peace. And I think once that set in motion, the prospects disappeared because Israel essentially saw its most powerful adversary removed from the equation and felt that this would give it a free hand

in the occupied territories, also in Lebanon, to get rid of the PLO and so on. You ask, when were we closest? And I can't give you an answer of when we were closest. I can only tell you when I think we could have been close, and that was a lost opportunity. If we look at the situation today, there's been a lot of discussion about a two-state settlement.

in the occupied territories, also in Lebanon, to get rid of the PLO and so on. You ask, when were we closest? And I can't give you an answer of when we were closest. I can only tell you when I think we could have been close, and that was a lost opportunity. If we look at the situation today, there's been a lot of discussion about a two-state settlement.

in the occupied territories, also in Lebanon, to get rid of the PLO and so on. You ask, when were we closest? And I can't give you an answer of when we were closest. I can only tell you when I think we could have been close, and that was a lost opportunity. If we look at the situation today, there's been a lot of discussion about a two-state settlement.

My own view, and I've written about this, I don't buy the arguments of the naysayers that we have passed the so-called point of no return with respect to a two-state settlement. Certainly, if you look at the Israeli position in the occupied territories.

My own view, and I've written about this, I don't buy the arguments of the naysayers that we have passed the so-called point of no return with respect to a two-state settlement. Certainly, if you look at the Israeli position in the occupied territories.

My own view, and I've written about this, I don't buy the arguments of the naysayers that we have passed the so-called point of no return with respect to a two-state settlement. Certainly, if you look at the Israeli position in the occupied territories.

I would argue it's more tenuous than was the French position in Algeria in 1954, than was a British position in Ireland in 1916, than was the Ethiopian position in Eritrea in 1990. And so as a matter of practicality, as a matter of principle, I do think the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories remains realistic.