Pete Hegseth
👤 SpeakerAppearances Over Time
Podcast Appearances
There were smart people from George Kennan to even the former CIA director, whatever you think of him, Bill Burns, who warned that this stuff would happen. And again, these decisions that we make in a certain moment, very focused on one thing, have second and third order consequences that sometimes are very easy to see. that they're quite obvious.
There were smart people from George Kennan to even the former CIA director, whatever you think of him, Bill Burns, who warned that this stuff would happen. And again, these decisions that we make in a certain moment, very focused on one thing, have second and third order consequences that sometimes are very easy to see. that they're quite obvious.
Like if anybody had any understanding of the region and the power dynamics in the region in 2003, they would have known, geez, removing Saddam Hussein, however awful he was, would inevitably benefit Iran. There was hardly any discussion of that in the lead up to the war.
Like if anybody had any understanding of the region and the power dynamics in the region in 2003, they would have known, geez, removing Saddam Hussein, however awful he was, would inevitably benefit Iran. There was hardly any discussion of that in the lead up to the war.
Like if anybody had any understanding of the region and the power dynamics in the region in 2003, they would have known, geez, removing Saddam Hussein, however awful he was, would inevitably benefit Iran. There was hardly any discussion of that in the lead up to the war.
Boy, that could be a three-hour conversation in and of itself. So I think there's a lot of reasons why. We invaded Iraq. None of them good. But the one thing that should be acknowledged is that even before 9-11, there was an effort to create the conditions for the United States to go and invade Iraq. They thought that by...
Boy, that could be a three-hour conversation in and of itself. So I think there's a lot of reasons why. We invaded Iraq. None of them good. But the one thing that should be acknowledged is that even before 9-11, there was an effort to create the conditions for the United States to go and invade Iraq. They thought that by...
Boy, that could be a three-hour conversation in and of itself. So I think there's a lot of reasons why. We invaded Iraq. None of them good. But the one thing that should be acknowledged is that even before 9-11, there was an effort to create the conditions for the United States to go and invade Iraq. They thought that by...
overthrowing Saddam, that this would lead to an outbreak of peace and democracy across the Middle East that predated 9-11. And you had things like the Project for a New American Century. You had Paul Wolfowitz at the tail end of the Bush administration, very angry that George H.W. Bush didn't go all the way in terms of Baghdad. I remember.
overthrowing Saddam, that this would lead to an outbreak of peace and democracy across the Middle East that predated 9-11. And you had things like the Project for a New American Century. You had Paul Wolfowitz at the tail end of the Bush administration, very angry that George H.W. Bush didn't go all the way in terms of Baghdad. I remember.
overthrowing Saddam, that this would lead to an outbreak of peace and democracy across the Middle East that predated 9-11. And you had things like the Project for a New American Century. You had Paul Wolfowitz at the tail end of the Bush administration, very angry that George H.W. Bush didn't go all the way in terms of Baghdad. I remember.
And then you had this post Cold War moment where the United States was not simply a superpower. It was a hyper power. And we had nobody who could effectively challenge us. Russia was a mess. China was still on the upswing. Some people could some smart people saw what was coming. But the assumption was we bring them into the WTO. We do free trade. China is going to become a democracy.
And then you had this post Cold War moment where the United States was not simply a superpower. It was a hyper power. And we had nobody who could effectively challenge us. Russia was a mess. China was still on the upswing. Some people could some smart people saw what was coming. But the assumption was we bring them into the WTO. We do free trade. China is going to become a democracy.
And then you had this post Cold War moment where the United States was not simply a superpower. It was a hyper power. And we had nobody who could effectively challenge us. Russia was a mess. China was still on the upswing. Some people could some smart people saw what was coming. But the assumption was we bring them into the WTO. We do free trade. China is going to become a democracy.
And so when when you have nobody in the world that can effectively challenge or check you, that can create political conditions domestically that lead people to think that there will be no consequences for American foreign policy. And I also think, too.
And so when when you have nobody in the world that can effectively challenge or check you, that can create political conditions domestically that lead people to think that there will be no consequences for American foreign policy. And I also think, too.
And so when when you have nobody in the world that can effectively challenge or check you, that can create political conditions domestically that lead people to think that there will be no consequences for American foreign policy. And I also think, too.
that are experienced in the Balkans, and how those wars went, also convinced a large part of the American security establishment that, oh, we can deal with Iraq rather cheaply and quickly, and it'd be no big deal.
that are experienced in the Balkans, and how those wars went, also convinced a large part of the American security establishment that, oh, we can deal with Iraq rather cheaply and quickly, and it'd be no big deal.
that are experienced in the Balkans, and how those wars went, also convinced a large part of the American security establishment that, oh, we can deal with Iraq rather cheaply and quickly, and it'd be no big deal.