Pierre Asselin

But in reality, it's an instrument used by Hanoi essentially to facilitate the mobilization of the South Vietnamese masses and recruit fighters among them.

Yeah. After the partition of Vietnam, after the French War, there was a 300-day period during which people could move from the south to the north, the north to the south. And we saw about like a million people. leave the North to resettle in the South. A lot of these guys were Catholics, were concerned about, you know, living under a communist regime in Northern Vietnam.

Yeah. After the partition of Vietnam, after the French War, there was a 300-day period during which people could move from the south to the north, the north to the south. And we saw about like a million people. leave the North to resettle in the South. A lot of these guys were Catholics, were concerned about, you know, living under a communist regime in Northern Vietnam.

Yeah. After the partition of Vietnam, after the French War, there was a 300-day period during which people could move from the south to the north, the north to the south. And we saw about like a million people. leave the North to resettle in the South. A lot of these guys were Catholics, were concerned about, you know, living under a communist regime in Northern Vietnam.

And then those guys, you know, become really, really staunch supporters of the regime in Saigon.

And then those guys, you know, become really, really staunch supporters of the regime in Saigon.

And then those guys, you know, become really, really staunch supporters of the regime in Saigon.

Eventually, Hanoi will start. So what you have in 54 also is that you have a movement the other way, right? People from the south moving to the north in 54, 55. And then as the situation escalates in the south, starting in 59, 60 or so, the southerners who had regrouped to the north then are redeployed to the south.

Eventually, Hanoi will start. So what you have in 54 also is that you have a movement the other way, right? People from the south moving to the north in 54, 55. And then as the situation escalates in the south, starting in 59, 60 or so, the southerners who had regrouped to the north then are redeployed to the south.

Eventually, Hanoi will start. So what you have in 54 also is that you have a movement the other way, right? People from the south moving to the north in 54, 55. And then as the situation escalates in the south, starting in 59, 60 or so, the southerners who had regrouped to the north then are redeployed to the south.

And at first, yeah, those are the guys kind of, you know, fighting South Vietnam and eventually the American advisors supporting the armed forces of South Vietnam. And when that's not sufficient, that's when leaders in Hanoi make the decision to start deploying North Vietnamese combat units into the South.

And at first, yeah, those are the guys kind of, you know, fighting South Vietnam and eventually the American advisors supporting the armed forces of South Vietnam. And when that's not sufficient, that's when leaders in Hanoi make the decision to start deploying North Vietnamese combat units into the South.

And at first, yeah, those are the guys kind of, you know, fighting South Vietnam and eventually the American advisors supporting the armed forces of South Vietnam. And when that's not sufficient, that's when leaders in Hanoi make the decision to start deploying North Vietnamese combat units into the South.

And what's interesting, Don, and I think we forget, is that we start witnessing the appearance of Northern Vietnamese combat units in late 64, early 65, before the Americans commit their own combat troops to South Vietnam.

And what's interesting, Don, and I think we forget, is that we start witnessing the appearance of Northern Vietnamese combat units in late 64, early 65, before the Americans commit their own combat troops to South Vietnam.

And what's interesting, Don, and I think we forget, is that we start witnessing the appearance of Northern Vietnamese combat units in late 64, early 65, before the Americans commit their own combat troops to South Vietnam.

And you know, Don, that's why I appreciate what you're doing here, because I think we've simplified the story of the war, right? The more I study the conflict, the more I realize whatever I learned from my mentors and my professors and from books, most of it is actually wrong or distorts these really, really complex realities. Thank you.

And you know, Don, that's why I appreciate what you're doing here, because I think we've simplified the story of the war, right? The more I study the conflict, the more I realize whatever I learned from my mentors and my professors and from books, most of it is actually wrong or distorts these really, really complex realities. Thank you.

And you know, Don, that's why I appreciate what you're doing here, because I think we've simplified the story of the war, right? The more I study the conflict, the more I realize whatever I learned from my mentors and my professors and from books, most of it is actually wrong or distorts these really, really complex realities. Thank you.

In terms of what the Americans really want, There's the credibility and honor aspect that we addressed earlier. Right. But in terms of like tangibles. Right. It's absolutely imperative for Nixon to get the prisoners of war back. I mean, that's and Hanoi understands that Hanoi understands that this is this is Washington's kryptonite. Right. And I really want to underscore that.