Professor Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones

Maybe as much as a third in some cases, but they're very, very small pieces of their levies. There's always been a question of why did they send so few troops? Why are these armies so small? The traditional argument has been, and is already there in Herodotus, that this is because the Spartans expected to lose, and they knew it was a suicide mission, and so they'd only send a small force.

But then the big question is why did they send so many, essentially?

But then the big question is why did they send so many, essentially?

But then the big question is why did they send so many, essentially?

They sent their king, Leonidas, with an army. Right, yeah. It seems like a very official move, but the later explanation is, oh, they needed to lose a king to meet a prophecy to save the rest of Greece. That's the argument. But it's very hard to explain why they would send so large an army in that case. I mean, send three guys, for God's sake. Send Leonidas himself alone. It doesn't matter.

They sent their king, Leonidas, with an army. Right, yeah. It seems like a very official move, but the later explanation is, oh, they needed to lose a king to meet a prophecy to save the rest of Greece. That's the argument. But it's very hard to explain why they would send so large an army in that case. I mean, send three guys, for God's sake. Send Leonidas himself alone. It doesn't matter.

They sent their king, Leonidas, with an army. Right, yeah. It seems like a very official move, but the later explanation is, oh, they needed to lose a king to meet a prophecy to save the rest of Greece. That's the argument. But it's very hard to explain why they would send so large an army in that case. I mean, send three guys, for God's sake. Send Leonidas himself alone. It doesn't matter.

Because this is something that happens with later Romans, right? They have a particular ritual where the general sacrifices himself, and that's supposed to be a good omen for victory. So let him do that by himself. I don't know why they would send a thousand guys to go and die with him. In any case, that's the story.

Because this is something that happens with later Romans, right? They have a particular ritual where the general sacrifices himself, and that's supposed to be a good omen for victory. So let him do that by himself. I don't know why they would send a thousand guys to go and die with him. In any case, that's the story.

Because this is something that happens with later Romans, right? They have a particular ritual where the general sacrifices himself, and that's supposed to be a good omen for victory. So let him do that by himself. I don't know why they would send a thousand guys to go and die with him. In any case, that's the story.

What seems to be happening really is that Sparta continues before and after this to be very reluctant to send troops north of the Peloponnese. That is not their traditional territory. They're not their traditional area of influence. And they seem very uncommitted to defending that against the Persians. So they mostly want the local population to handle that. And they don't want to get too into it.

What seems to be happening really is that Sparta continues before and after this to be very reluctant to send troops north of the Peloponnese. That is not their traditional territory. They're not their traditional area of influence. And they seem very uncommitted to defending that against the Persians. So they mostly want the local population to handle that. And they don't want to get too into it.

What seems to be happening really is that Sparta continues before and after this to be very reluctant to send troops north of the Peloponnese. That is not their traditional territory. They're not their traditional area of influence. And they seem very uncommitted to defending that against the Persians. So they mostly want the local population to handle that. And they don't want to get too into it.

They don't want to risk their troops in this sort of very advanced forward position. And it's very informative to compare the Spartan commitment of 1,000 men to Thermopylae to the Athenian commitment of almost 200 triremes, which is 40,000 men to the Battle of Artemision.

They don't want to risk their troops in this sort of very advanced forward position. And it's very informative to compare the Spartan commitment of 1,000 men to Thermopylae to the Athenian commitment of almost 200 triremes, which is 40,000 men to the Battle of Artemision.

They don't want to risk their troops in this sort of very advanced forward position. And it's very informative to compare the Spartan commitment of 1,000 men to Thermopylae to the Athenian commitment of almost 200 triremes, which is 40,000 men to the Battle of Artemision.

I mean, this is an enormous fleet, which would have emptied Athens, that is being sent to take part of the naval leg of this strategy. Whereas on land, the Spartans are half-hearted at best. It's interesting that we haven't actually mentioned the number 300 there at all, Ruud. You said it's a thousand Spartans. Yeah, it's the alternative tradition that I'm going with.

I mean, this is an enormous fleet, which would have emptied Athens, that is being sent to take part of the naval leg of this strategy. Whereas on land, the Spartans are half-hearted at best. It's interesting that we haven't actually mentioned the number 300 there at all, Ruud. You said it's a thousand Spartans. Yeah, it's the alternative tradition that I'm going with.

I mean, this is an enormous fleet, which would have emptied Athens, that is being sent to take part of the naval leg of this strategy. Whereas on land, the Spartans are half-hearted at best. It's interesting that we haven't actually mentioned the number 300 there at all, Ruud. You said it's a thousand Spartans. Yeah, it's the alternative tradition that I'm going with.

Essentially, there are two different source traditions. One says 300, the other says a thousand. The best way to reconcile them is to assume that there were 300 full Spartan citizens, and then 700 other Spartans who are not citizens, but who are freeborn and fight as hoplites. That's very common in later Spartan armies, that they rely quite heavily on these