Professor Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones

for their fleet to get into position so that they could outflank both forces simultaneously.

for their fleet to get into position so that they could outflank both forces simultaneously.

Exactly. And so this is basically how this path has always been turned in every occasion in history since. That path is always the way that you do that. And that's what the Romans did against the Seleucids and many other peoples later. You always go around through the mountain and that always wins. Yeah. That always sort of succeeds.

Exactly. And so this is basically how this path has always been turned in every occasion in history since. That path is always the way that you do that. And that's what the Romans did against the Seleucids and many other peoples later. You always go around through the mountain and that always wins. Yeah. That always sort of succeeds.

Exactly. And so this is basically how this path has always been turned in every occasion in history since. That path is always the way that you do that. And that's what the Romans did against the Seleucids and many other peoples later. You always go around through the mountain and that always wins. Yeah. That always sort of succeeds.

The problem is that that fleet that's been trying to encircle the Greeks at Artemision, it was lost in a storm. So those ships just never arrive. And that is what drives the Persians to finally try and attack both at Thermopylae and at Artemision, is that it didn't work. So they have to try and find a different way.

The problem is that that fleet that's been trying to encircle the Greeks at Artemision, it was lost in a storm. So those ships just never arrive. And that is what drives the Persians to finally try and attack both at Thermopylae and at Artemision, is that it didn't work. So they have to try and find a different way.

The problem is that that fleet that's been trying to encircle the Greeks at Artemision, it was lost in a storm. So those ships just never arrive. And that is what drives the Persians to finally try and attack both at Thermopylae and at Artemision, is that it didn't work. So they have to try and find a different way.

But by that point, they figured out that there is a pathway that leads them around the Thermopylae Pass. So in the night, they march the immortals over that path. The Phocians, who are themselves set to guard the path, don't act for reasons we don't quite understand, possibly just fear, possibly because they've made a deal with the Persians.

But by that point, they figured out that there is a pathway that leads them around the Thermopylae Pass. So in the night, they march the immortals over that path. The Phocians, who are themselves set to guard the path, don't act for reasons we don't quite understand, possibly just fear, possibly because they've made a deal with the Persians.

But by that point, they figured out that there is a pathway that leads them around the Thermopylae Pass. So in the night, they march the immortals over that path. The Phocians, who are themselves set to guard the path, don't act for reasons we don't quite understand, possibly just fear, possibly because they've made a deal with the Persians.

And so they let them through and the immortals come down behind the pass. And at that point, the allied position has become untenable, essentially. So then the big question is what the Allies do. It's often been argued that the Spartans are staying behind to kind of keep the Persians in a fight so that the rest of the Allies can get away as a sort of rearguard defense.

And so they let them through and the immortals come down behind the pass. And at that point, the allied position has become untenable, essentially. So then the big question is what the Allies do. It's often been argued that the Spartans are staying behind to kind of keep the Persians in a fight so that the rest of the Allies can get away as a sort of rearguard defense.

And so they let them through and the immortals come down behind the pass. And at that point, the allied position has become untenable, essentially. So then the big question is what the Allies do. It's often been argued that the Spartans are staying behind to kind of keep the Persians in a fight so that the rest of the Allies can get away as a sort of rearguard defense.

But the problem with that argument is that the Spartans hear in the night that the Persians are coming. They have long advance warning that the Persians are over the pass and they're coming in behind. And all of the other Allies already leaving at that point, they know that they can't hold this position, so they're just gone.

But the problem with that argument is that the Spartans hear in the night that the Persians are coming. They have long advance warning that the Persians are over the pass and they're coming in behind. And all of the other Allies already leaving at that point, they know that they can't hold this position, so they're just gone.

But the problem with that argument is that the Spartans hear in the night that the Persians are coming. They have long advance warning that the Persians are over the pass and they're coming in behind. And all of the other Allies already leaving at that point, they know that they can't hold this position, so they're just gone.

But Leonidas waits until the morning to make any kind of decision on what to do. So it's not until well into the day that he actually decides when he hears from a messenger again, like they're really coming down the mountain now, we should probably do something, that he decides, no, actually, we're going to stay. So he's already wasted all of his opportunities to extract his force safely.

But Leonidas waits until the morning to make any kind of decision on what to do. So it's not until well into the day that he actually decides when he hears from a messenger again, like they're really coming down the mountain now, we should probably do something, that he decides, no, actually, we're going to stay. So he's already wasted all of his opportunities to extract his force safely.

But Leonidas waits until the morning to make any kind of decision on what to do. So it's not until well into the day that he actually decides when he hears from a messenger again, like they're really coming down the mountain now, we should probably do something, that he decides, no, actually, we're going to stay. So he's already wasted all of his opportunities to extract his force safely.