Ron Brownstein
๐ค PersonAppearances Over Time
Podcast Appearances
Yeah, I'll go to the inaugural. And it was so cramped that I was sitting on the, you know, how you sit on the edge.
Yeah, I'll go to the inaugural. And it was so cramped that I was sitting on the, you know, how you sit on the edge.
It was inside the Capitol. I think it was in the rotunda, you know, and there was a press riser with like, you know, all these cameras packed in, which would normally be spread out on the mall. And I was sitting next to a senator, like because we were all there was no place for anybody, you know. So there you go. Trump, you know, will not be the biggest crowd ever, I guess.
It was inside the Capitol. I think it was in the rotunda, you know, and there was a press riser with like, you know, all these cameras packed in, which would normally be spread out on the mall. And I was sitting next to a senator, like because we were all there was no place for anybody, you know. So there you go. Trump, you know, will not be the biggest crowd ever, I guess.
It was inside the Capitol. I think it was in the rotunda, you know, and there was a press riser with like, you know, all these cameras packed in, which would normally be spread out on the mall. And I was sitting next to a senator, like because we were all there was no place for anybody, you know. So there you go. Trump, you know, will not be the biggest crowd ever, I guess.
So there's a great political scientist at Yale named Stephen Skowronek, who wrote a book in 1993, he's updated a few times, that argues that presidents fail or succeed based not only on their innate talents, but where they fall in the cycle of competition between the parties. There's kind of a waxing and waning of the strength of the parties through American history.
So there's a great political scientist at Yale named Stephen Skowronek, who wrote a book in 1993, he's updated a few times, that argues that presidents fail or succeed based not only on their innate talents, but where they fall in the cycle of competition between the parties. There's kind of a waxing and waning of the strength of the parties through American history.
So there's a great political scientist at Yale named Stephen Skowronek, who wrote a book in 1993, he's updated a few times, that argues that presidents fail or succeed based not only on their innate talents, but where they fall in the cycle of competition between the parties. There's kind of a waxing and waning of the strength of the parties through American history.
great realigning elections of 1828, 1860, 1896, 1932, arguably 1968, to some extent 1992, where the balance of power in the electorate shifts toward one side. And Skowronek basically argues that the presidents that we consider the weakest through American history are
great realigning elections of 1828, 1860, 1896, 1932, arguably 1968, to some extent 1992, where the balance of power in the electorate shifts toward one side. And Skowronek basically argues that the presidents that we consider the weakest through American history are
great realigning elections of 1828, 1860, 1896, 1932, arguably 1968, to some extent 1992, where the balance of power in the electorate shifts toward one side. And Skowronek basically argues that the presidents that we consider the weakest through American history are
are those who come in at the tail end, kind of the ass end of one of these coalitions, a coalition that has seen better days, but is able to squeeze out one more victory. So that would be John Adams in 1800, John Quincy Adams, his son in 1824, Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan for the Democrats in the 1850s, Hoover in 1928, Carter in 1976.
are those who come in at the tail end, kind of the ass end of one of these coalitions, a coalition that has seen better days, but is able to squeeze out one more victory. So that would be John Adams in 1800, John Quincy Adams, his son in 1824, Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan for the Democrats in the 1850s, Hoover in 1928, Carter in 1976.
are those who come in at the tail end, kind of the ass end of one of these coalitions, a coalition that has seen better days, but is able to squeeze out one more victory. So that would be John Adams in 1800, John Quincy Adams, his son in 1824, Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan for the Democrats in the 1850s, Hoover in 1928, Carter in 1976.
H.W. would kind of count, too. Yeah. I mean, H.W. would kind of count, too. There was a shift in the electorate in 92. Democrats won the White House in four of the next six elections. won the popular vote in five of those next six elections. Trump wins in 2016, showing clear evidence of kind of, you know, fracturing the Democratic coalition.
H.W. would kind of count, too. Yeah. I mean, H.W. would kind of count, too. There was a shift in the electorate in 92. Democrats won the White House in four of the next six elections. won the popular vote in five of those next six elections. Trump wins in 2016, showing clear evidence of kind of, you know, fracturing the Democratic coalition.
H.W. would kind of count, too. Yeah. I mean, H.W. would kind of count, too. There was a shift in the electorate in 92. Democrats won the White House in four of the next six elections. won the popular vote in five of those next six elections. Trump wins in 2016, showing clear evidence of kind of, you know, fracturing the Democratic coalition.
And then Biden comes in in 2020 and looks like he's put all the pieces back together. Right. And you have that kind of Clinton era coalition of strong support among minorities, growing support among college educated whites and just enough support among non-college whites, particularly in the Rust Belt. And in many ways, this is reminiscent of Carter. Right. Because.
And then Biden comes in in 2020 and looks like he's put all the pieces back together. Right. And you have that kind of Clinton era coalition of strong support among minorities, growing support among college educated whites and just enough support among non-college whites, particularly in the Rust Belt. And in many ways, this is reminiscent of Carter. Right. Because.
And then Biden comes in in 2020 and looks like he's put all the pieces back together. Right. And you have that kind of Clinton era coalition of strong support among minorities, growing support among college educated whites and just enough support among non-college whites, particularly in the Rust Belt. And in many ways, this is reminiscent of Carter. Right. Because.