Rory Johnston
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Appearances Over Time
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And what we will talk about shortly, I'm sure, is all the ways in which the system adapted and flexed.
And I think we saw this most notably above all in China.
Yeah, so I would say the two biggest things, one on the fundamentals, on the barrel counting side, was China.
We always knew that China had huge stockpiles of oil, but we didn't know how they were going to react to this crisis.
And what we've seen through this crisis is that Chinese oil imports, crude oil imports into China, the world's largest crude oil importer, fell by upwards of 5 million barrels a day between the three-month average prior to the war through to June.
Now, we're not quite done this month, but that's roughly where we're trending for June so far.
That 5 million barrels a day was upwards of half of the total spot market supply hit to Asia.
And that allowed a lot of those other Asian importers to basically not have the competition that they would have had for the barrels they were importing.
So the countries that were hit hardest by this crisis and the governments that were most panicked, governments in South Korea,
Korea, Australia, Japan, Taiwan, et cetera, there was a period where like the prime minister of Australia was coming out daily and announcing the Australian government's successful acquisition of a cargo of diesel.
Like it felt very COVID-y.
Now, those importers saw imports collapse through March and April.
But through May and into June, they actually recovered basically to pre-war levels.
And the largest facilitator of that was the fact that China was not competing for any of the other barrels.
And it absorbed so much of the shock itself.
It's a good question.
And the firm answer is we do not have 100% certainty as to what the exact composition of that swing was.
We know the oil going in fell by 5 to 6 million barrels a day, given products as well.
But in terms of the actual demand destruction, the thing that we have seen across China is that all of the mobility indicators β and you guys were actually in China very recently β
All the mobility indicators showed no notable decline.