Rory Johnston

It was so big and China was still pretty weak coming out of COVID zero at that point.

It didn't seem plausible.

And I kind of speculated that maybe they were building refined product stocks, which we can't see because of the way we calculate this stuff.

And at the time, the worry was that it was in anticipation of a war or an invasion of Taiwan.

At that stage, you had an increased bellicosity of Beijing, a lot of saber rattling, buzzing airspace, naval drills, et cetera.

So I think that was definitely part of it.

That was the thought at the time.

Now, what we've seen is that obviously came in very, very handy.

Now, for much the same reason, although not getting blockaded through Malacca, but just the lack of Hormuz itself, which, again, was always part of China's kind of strategic or perception of strategic precarity of its stockpiles.

But I think to this point of, like, why?

This is the question that continues I continue to obsess about because it also kind of tells you when they're going to reenter the market.

Because as we will talk right now, not only are crude oil prices collapsing, but we've actually seen prompt Brent time spreads.

The difference between the first and the second contract actually flipping to outright contango today.

So I think it's a particularly suspicious day.

We're swimming in oil, at least relative to demand.

And I think part of that is that China just still hasn't stepped back in as a competitive importer.

So to your point, Joe, this idea that like maybe Beijing was playing the altruistic neighbor, which I think is I think one of the theories I'm holding as well.

which is not only do they want to kind of be seen as the good neighbor, not only do they want to be seen as kind of standing up and defending its neighbors when very clearly in their telling, Washington has abandoned you and kind of stuck you with this massive energy crisis.

The challenge, I think, with that, I think also if China is trying to pivot away from the U.S.

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