Sam Altman

And it's an example of where I think you see the dangers of incentive misalignment.

Because as the Fed kept raising, I assume that the incentives on people working at SVB to not sell at a loss their super safe bonds, which were now down 20% or whatever, or down less than that, but then kept going down.

That's like a classic example of incentive misalignment.

Now, I suspect they're not the only bank in a bad position here.

The response of the federal government, I think, took much longer than it should have.

But by Sunday afternoon, I was glad they had done what they've done.

We'll see what happens next.

What I think would be good to do right now is just, and this requires statutory change, but it may be a full guarantee of deposits, maybe a much, much higher than 250k.

But you really don't want depositors having to doubt

the security of their deposits.

And this thing that a lot of people on Twitter were saying is like, well, it's their fault.

They should have been like, you know, reading the balance sheet and the risk audit of the bank.

Like, do we really want people to have to do that?

I would argue no.

Well, there was a weekend of terror for sure.

And now I think even though it was only 10 days ago, it feels like forever and people have forgotten about it.

But it kind of reveals the fragility of our economic system.

We may not be done.

That may have been like the gun shown falling off the nightstand in the first scene of the movie or whatever.

It could be like other banks.