Scott Horton

I don't think that's his official position.

Or if it is, it's with a strong implication, as everyone understands, that it's a latent nuclear weapons capability and a potential threat.

actual nuclear weapons capability.

Yes.

Yes.

And then the thing is too, just like I was saying before, if Trump had come in in 2017 and said, screw this, I hate this deal.

And then got on a plane and flown straight to Tehran and said, or, you know, sent his guys and said, now listen here, Ayatollah, I want to fix this deal up better.

I think that he really could have.

And I already said, I don't know the details, but I believe Mark when he says that the Europeans were being intransigent on that.

And again, I criticize the CIA and FBI for framing Trump for treason, for preventing him from being able to work with the Russians to see if maybe they could put pressure on the Ayatollah to deal with him.

But I think that it's clear when the Ayatollah was willing in the JCPOA,

Well, first of all, to sign the additional protocol back in the W. Bush years.

For three years, he didn't enrich anything under that deal as long as he was negotiating with the E3.

And then under the JCPOA, where he's shipping out every bit of his declared nuclear material, he's clearly keeping the ability to enrich, if necessary, to weapons grade if a crisis breaks out and he feels like he has to make nukes.

But he had no stockpile available.

to unrest this whole thing about 99% of the way there, he had no stockpile.

So even if you, uh, you know, count dry gassing up your truck on the way to the mine, as part of this long time scale of percentages here, they were much further from a nuke under the deal, which he agrees we shouldn't have even gotten out of.

I think we really don't know.

There's some initial battle assessments and arguments and all that about just how much was destroyed and what.

And we don't know exactly what their reaction is going to be.