Scott Mann

I mean, I would love to hear Legend's take on, you know, the long game that these individuals play with the Caliphate. And I think it starts with that. You know, we have a... This is me looking back on 20 years of war. I think we have a very Western way of thinking about things and a preferred way of war.

I mean, I would love to hear Legend's take on, you know, the long game that these individuals play with the Caliphate. And I think it starts with that. You know, we have a... This is me looking back on 20 years of war. I think we have a very Western way of thinking about things and a preferred way of war.

I mean, I would love to hear Legend's take on, you know, the long game that these individuals play with the Caliphate. And I think it starts with that. You know, we have a... This is me looking back on 20 years of war. I think we have a very Western way of thinking about things and a preferred way of war.

Look at how we took counterinsurgency and we literally lifted it over from Vietnam and applied it into Afghanistan, into that rural insurgency. So we applied a counterinsurgency model and fought it for 20 years and mixed in with a CT strategy where we were essentially mowing the grass, cutting the heads off, but then new ones grew.

Look at how we took counterinsurgency and we literally lifted it over from Vietnam and applied it into Afghanistan, into that rural insurgency. So we applied a counterinsurgency model and fought it for 20 years and mixed in with a CT strategy where we were essentially mowing the grass, cutting the heads off, but then new ones grew.

Look at how we took counterinsurgency and we literally lifted it over from Vietnam and applied it into Afghanistan, into that rural insurgency. So we applied a counterinsurgency model and fought it for 20 years and mixed in with a CT strategy where we were essentially mowing the grass, cutting the heads off, but then new ones grew.

But I do think that when you, we really have to look carefully at how do these individuals think about their end game. They're fighting a, if necessary, a multi-sensory narrative. They're prepared to stay with this thing to the end. And they love, it's often said they love death as much as we love life in order to achieve that. So I just don't think we're even in the same arena.

But I do think that when you, we really have to look carefully at how do these individuals think about their end game. They're fighting a, if necessary, a multi-sensory narrative. They're prepared to stay with this thing to the end. And they love, it's often said they love death as much as we love life in order to achieve that. So I just don't think we're even in the same arena.

But I do think that when you, we really have to look carefully at how do these individuals think about their end game. They're fighting a, if necessary, a multi-sensory narrative. They're prepared to stay with this thing to the end. And they love, it's often said they love death as much as we love life in order to achieve that. So I just don't think we're even in the same arena.

in terms of mindset, and we don't fully appreciate the level of persistence that they have to meet their strategic goals, and that they have no intention, they being the small percentage of Islamist radicals who are hijacking this religion, they have no intention of coexisting with the West.

in terms of mindset, and we don't fully appreciate the level of persistence that they have to meet their strategic goals, and that they have no intention, they being the small percentage of Islamist radicals who are hijacking this religion, they have no intention of coexisting with the West.

in terms of mindset, and we don't fully appreciate the level of persistence that they have to meet their strategic goals, and that they have no intention, they being the small percentage of Islamist radicals who are hijacking this religion, they have no intention of coexisting with the West.

And do another war. I just don't see that level of coherence at our federal government level. And this is this is not administration specific. I just just based on, for example, Sean, what happened with the withdrawal in Afghanistan, you know, that was. I think the National Security Council put out its evacuation memo on 14 August. Right.

And do another war. I just don't see that level of coherence at our federal government level. And this is this is not administration specific. I just just based on, for example, Sean, what happened with the withdrawal in Afghanistan, you know, that was. I think the National Security Council put out its evacuation memo on 14 August. Right.

And do another war. I just don't see that level of coherence at our federal government level. And this is this is not administration specific. I just just based on, for example, Sean, what happened with the withdrawal in Afghanistan, you know, that was. I think the National Security Council put out its evacuation memo on 14 August. Right.

And, you know, I have it on good authority that that thing was one hell of an afterthought. Like they were scrambling to get that. And this was just this was like who was to prioritize for evacuation. Kabul fell on the 15th. This thing came out on the 14th. So there's nothing at least that I've seen that tells me that there's like a coherent approach to this of keeping it going.

And, you know, I have it on good authority that that thing was one hell of an afterthought. Like they were scrambling to get that. And this was just this was like who was to prioritize for evacuation. Kabul fell on the 15th. This thing came out on the 14th. So there's nothing at least that I've seen that tells me that there's like a coherent approach to this of keeping it going.

And, you know, I have it on good authority that that thing was one hell of an afterthought. Like they were scrambling to get that. And this was just this was like who was to prioritize for evacuation. Kabul fell on the 15th. This thing came out on the 14th. So there's nothing at least that I've seen that tells me that there's like a coherent approach to this of keeping it going.

I think from my perspective, it's more of a, just an inability to really, it's hubris. I mean, it's arrogance at an institutional level to think that we really comprehend and appreciate just the persistence, will and capacity of this threat. You know, I mean, even if you just look at like, Where we are today is so reminiscent of pre-9-11.

I think from my perspective, it's more of a, just an inability to really, it's hubris. I mean, it's arrogance at an institutional level to think that we really comprehend and appreciate just the persistence, will and capacity of this threat. You know, I mean, even if you just look at like, Where we are today is so reminiscent of pre-9-11.