Sean Carroll

I'm a good Bayesian.

And then within each universe, I'm going to say how many, you know, the chance I'll be any particular observer.

So that leads to all sorts of presumptuous sounding conclusions as well.

But those guys sort of labeled the other side, the third or side, as presumptuous first.

So they call them that.

I think that the whole thing is a lot of presumptuousness going around.

What is the label in the third view?

All right, good.

I'm glad that they all have names.

The names could be snappy, I've got to say.

But let me put forward, at the risk of derailing, I don't believe any of these approaches.

I'll tell you what I believe.

I don't think it lines up with anything you've said so far.

It's closest to what Radford Neal calls fully non-indexical conditioning.

Do you know about that?

Ah, yes.

I like that paper.

So what I would just say, just to make it as short as possible, is I don't care how many observers there are in the universe.

I share your worry that it's kind of presumptuous just to say I've proven a theory right just without leaving my armchair because there's a lot of observers in it.

But I do think it's fair to say, to judge theories by what is the probability that in that theory there would arise at least one observer exactly like me.