Sean Carroll

Gary Miller says, But if you read this question aloud to your entire audience and agree that any one person's vote doesn't matter, you risk alienating a large group of people from voting. It seems like democracy depends on people believing something untrue that their vote matters. Is this an inherent problem with democracy?

Well, there's certainly some problem with democracy that you have two choices. Either you let voting be voluntary, which happens in most places, and then some people don't do it. Or you make it mandatory and then you're going to have voters who are hilariously under-informed. And in fact, that still happens when the voting is voluntary. Right.

Well, there's certainly some problem with democracy that you have two choices. Either you let voting be voluntary, which happens in most places, and then some people don't do it. Or you make it mandatory and then you're going to have voters who are hilariously under-informed. And in fact, that still happens when the voting is voluntary. Right.

So I don't think there's any perfect solution to these questions. You know, I don't think it's right to think of democracy as trying to be a method for making the best decisions. It's trying to be a method of giving people a voice. And of course, any one person's voice is small in countries that are as large as ours.

So I don't think there's any perfect solution to these questions. You know, I don't think it's right to think of democracy as trying to be a method for making the best decisions. It's trying to be a method of giving people a voice. And of course, any one person's voice is small in countries that are as large as ours.

I think an underappreciated problem with democracy is just that nations are big now. I mean, 200 years ago, we didn't have 300 million people in the country, and the voices mattered a little bit more. So there's a lot of things going on here. We talked about this with Herb Gintis, among other things, and it's a reflection of – a more general issue in philosophy, in moral philosophy or whatever.

I think an underappreciated problem with democracy is just that nations are big now. I mean, 200 years ago, we didn't have 300 million people in the country, and the voices mattered a little bit more. So there's a lot of things going on here. We talked about this with Herb Gintis, among other things, and it's a reflection of – a more general issue in philosophy, in moral philosophy or whatever.

So Immanuel Kant would tell you you should act if you want to act morally in such a way so that your actions may be the basis for a general principle, right? In other words, the golden rule, basically the golden rule. The categorical imperative is a slightly philosophized-up version of the golden rule. It says act the way you want everyone else to act, right? But why?

So Immanuel Kant would tell you you should act if you want to act morally in such a way so that your actions may be the basis for a general principle, right? In other words, the golden rule, basically the golden rule. The categorical imperative is a slightly philosophized-up version of the golden rule. It says act the way you want everyone else to act, right? But why?

Why should I do that if it's not actually true that everyone else will act the way that I'm supposed to act? Why should I be acting in that way? Now, of course, counterfactually, if everyone acts the way they want everyone else to act, then they will all inform themselves and they will vote, et cetera, et cetera.

Why should I do that if it's not actually true that everyone else will act the way that I'm supposed to act? Why should I be acting in that way? Now, of course, counterfactually, if everyone acts the way they want everyone else to act, then they will all inform themselves and they will vote, et cetera, et cetera.

So even if that doesn't happen, should we act because we want it to happen in the way that we would be acting if it were happening? That's the question. And the answer is not obvious. The answer is not obvious at all. I mean, Herb Gintas's answer was something like it's kind of tribal affiliation signaling, right? We don't vote thinking that our vote will be the tiebreaker.

So even if that doesn't happen, should we act because we want it to happen in the way that we would be acting if it were happening? That's the question. And the answer is not obvious. The answer is not obvious at all. I mean, Herb Gintas's answer was something like it's kind of tribal affiliation signaling, right? We don't vote thinking that our vote will be the tiebreaker.

We vote thinking that we are expressing ourselves. We are saying, here is who I stand for, where I want the country or the municipality to go, things like that. And it's rational in a way that is different than how we pretend it's rational. We pretend it's rational because we're choosing who is going to lead us, and collectively that happens.

We vote thinking that we are expressing ourselves. We are saying, here is who I stand for, where I want the country or the municipality to go, things like that. And it's rational in a way that is different than how we pretend it's rational. We pretend it's rational because we're choosing who is going to lead us, and collectively that happens.

But at the individual level, the rationality is about belonging to a group, not about making a decision. Does that hang together? I really don't know. You know, I do think that there's a give and take between our individual actions and how we influence others. So therefore, I am very much in favor of both voting and encouraging other people to vote.

But at the individual level, the rationality is about belonging to a group, not about making a decision. Does that hang together? I really don't know. You know, I do think that there's a give and take between our individual actions and how we influence others. So therefore, I am very much in favor of both voting and encouraging other people to vote.

Chris A. says, why is developing a quantum description of gravity so difficult? A lot of very smart people have been trying very hard for nearly 100 years. So what is it about the problem that makes it so intractable? It's a great question, you know, one that does get talked about, but maybe deserves to be talked about more. And I think that there are two kinds of problems. This is not just me.

Chris A. says, why is developing a quantum description of gravity so difficult? A lot of very smart people have been trying very hard for nearly 100 years. So what is it about the problem that makes it so intractable? It's a great question, you know, one that does get talked about, but maybe deserves to be talked about more. And I think that there are two kinds of problems. This is not just me.

I'm not just making this up. There is a standard understanding that there are two kinds of problems with quantizing gravity. There are technical problems and there are conceptual problems. The technical problems are just that, according to the ordinary ways we have of doing quantum field theory, which is what you should need to do in gravity since gravity