Sean Carroll

Do you think it is correct under those conditions where there's 100 of you, 99 of them are on Podemkin's, one is on the enterprise?

Do you think it's the right thing to do to assign equal credences to being any of them?

I think that's perfectly fair, because Bolson brains do shake one up.

But let's table it, because I think it's OK to first talk about the simpler cases, right, and to get them right.

But you're right that thinking about complicated cases can shake your confidence in the simple cases.

What would be the counter argument to the audience members who don't know?

In my mind, there's people like David Albert and Emily Adlam who have criticized assigning equal credences.

But their alternative is just you can't do anything.

You're stuck.

There's no rational way to behave.

Okay, good.

Yeah, I think we should be able to get there.

But I'm just trying to let the audience in on the idea that whether or not it's completely accepted in the community, one can presumably offer up justifications for saying that we should give equal credence to every individual.

instance of us that is created in the transporter machine, right?

It's not just like, well, it feels right.

We can be slightly more sophisticated in that.

There are theorems one can prove under certain assumptions one can specify.

Well, you did mention the idea that it's – one of the assumptions we're making here in the simple story is – or one of the premises is like there's two or 100 copies of you in the same world.

There's at least – one could imagine, though, that the same kind of reasoning works for different worlds.

Like the example I like to use is –