Serhii Plokhy

After this scandal with Stashinsky, at least on many levels, the KGB stopped the practice of the assassinations, political assassinations abroad, because it was considered politically to be extremely dangerous. The person who was in charge of the KGB at the time of Bandera assassination, Shalepin, was one of the candidates to replace Khrushchev.

After this scandal with Stashinsky, at least on many levels, the KGB stopped the practice of the assassinations, political assassinations abroad, because it was considered politically to be extremely dangerous. The person who was in charge of the KGB at the time of Bandera assassination, Shalepin, was one of the candidates to replace Khrushchev.

Brezhnev used against him that scandal abroad, eventually to remove him from Politburo. The KGB was really looking at the party leadership as to a degree ineffective, corrupt, and who was on their way. From what I understand, that's exactly the attitudes. that people like Putin and people of his circle brought to power in Kremlin.

Brezhnev used against him that scandal abroad, eventually to remove him from Politburo. The KGB was really looking at the party leadership as to a degree ineffective, corrupt, and who was on their way. From what I understand, that's exactly the attitudes. that people like Putin and people of his circle brought to power in Kremlin.

Brezhnev used against him that scandal abroad, eventually to remove him from Politburo. The KGB was really looking at the party leadership as to a degree ineffective, corrupt, and who was on their way. From what I understand, that's exactly the attitudes. that people like Putin and people of his circle brought to power in Kremlin.

So the methods that KGB use, they can use now, and there is no party or no other institution actually stopping them from doing that. And they think about, my understanding, the operations abroad, about foreign policy in general in terms of the KGB mindset of planning operations and executing particular operations and so on and so forth.

So the methods that KGB use, they can use now, and there is no party or no other institution actually stopping them from doing that. And they think about, my understanding, the operations abroad, about foreign policy in general in terms of the KGB mindset of planning operations and executing particular operations and so on and so forth.

So the methods that KGB use, they can use now, and there is no party or no other institution actually stopping them from doing that. And they think about, my understanding, the operations abroad, about foreign policy in general in terms of the KGB mindset of planning operations and executing particular operations and so on and so forth.

I think a lot of culture that came into existence in the Soviet KGB now became part of the culture of the Russian establishment.

I think a lot of culture that came into existence in the Soviet KGB now became part of the culture of the Russian establishment.

I think a lot of culture that came into existence in the Soviet KGB now became part of the culture of the Russian establishment.

The key moments would be first the year 2004, known for Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and then the year 2013, known as the Revolution of Dignity. Both were the revolts against something that, by a significant part of the Ukrainian population, was considered to be completely unacceptable actions on the part of the government and people in the government at that time.

The key moments would be first the year 2004, known for Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and then the year 2013, known as the Revolution of Dignity. Both were the revolts against something that, by a significant part of the Ukrainian population, was considered to be completely unacceptable actions on the part of the government and people in the government at that time.

The key moments would be first the year 2004, known for Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and then the year 2013, known as the Revolution of Dignity. Both were the revolts against something that, by a significant part of the Ukrainian population, was considered to be completely unacceptable actions on the part of the government and people in the government at that time.

So the Orange Revolution of 2004 was a protest against falsified presidential elections. and rejection of a candidate that was supported by Russia, publicly supported by Russia. I remember being in Moscow at that time and couldn't believe my eyes when in the center of Russia I saw a billboard with Yanukovych.

So the Orange Revolution of 2004 was a protest against falsified presidential elections. and rejection of a candidate that was supported by Russia, publicly supported by Russia. I remember being in Moscow at that time and couldn't believe my eyes when in the center of Russia I saw a billboard with Yanukovych.

So the Orange Revolution of 2004 was a protest against falsified presidential elections. and rejection of a candidate that was supported by Russia, publicly supported by Russia. I remember being in Moscow at that time and couldn't believe my eyes when in the center of Russia I saw a billboard with Yanukovych.

The trick was that there were a lot of Ukrainians in Russia and in Moscow in particular, and they had the right to vote. It led to the election of, as Ukrainian president, Viktor Yushchenko, who put on the agenda the issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO. So it was very clear pro-Western orientation.

The trick was that there were a lot of Ukrainians in Russia and in Moscow in particular, and they had the right to vote. It led to the election of, as Ukrainian president, Viktor Yushchenko, who put on the agenda the issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO. So it was very clear pro-Western orientation.

The trick was that there were a lot of Ukrainians in Russia and in Moscow in particular, and they had the right to vote. It led to the election of, as Ukrainian president, Viktor Yushchenko, who put on the agenda the issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO. So it was very clear pro-Western orientation.