Serhii Plokhy

As a historian, I'm trained that way. I have a feeling of deja vu. I see the Cold War is coming back in many of its features. And the war started, and we discussed that, in 2014, at least in my interpretation, with Russia trying to really reestablish its control over the post-Soviet space, and Ukraine was crucial for that project.

As a historian, I'm trained that way. I have a feeling of deja vu. I see the Cold War is coming back in many of its features. And the war started, and we discussed that, in 2014, at least in my interpretation, with Russia trying to really reestablish its control over the post-Soviet space, and Ukraine was crucial for that project.

And the more globally Russian vision since 1990s was that they didn't like the American monopolar world. They knew and realized that they couldn't go back to the bipolar world of the Cold War era. So the vision was multipolar world in which, again, it wasn't just academic exercise.

And the more globally Russian vision since 1990s was that they didn't like the American monopolar world. They knew and realized that they couldn't go back to the bipolar world of the Cold War era. So the vision was multipolar world in which, again, it wasn't just academic exercise.

And the more globally Russian vision since 1990s was that they didn't like the American monopolar world. They knew and realized that they couldn't go back to the bipolar world of the Cold War era. So the vision was multipolar world in which, again, it wasn't just academic exercise.

It was a political exercise in which Russia would be one of the centers, one of the poles on par with China, on par with European Union, on par with the United States. That's very broadly speaking the context in which the war starts in 2014. Where we are now?

It was a political exercise in which Russia would be one of the centers, one of the poles on par with China, on par with European Union, on par with the United States. That's very broadly speaking the context in which the war starts in 2014. Where we are now?

It was a political exercise in which Russia would be one of the centers, one of the poles on par with China, on par with European Union, on par with the United States. That's very broadly speaking the context in which the war starts in 2014. Where we are now?

Well, we are now in Russia certainly trying to regain its military strength, but no one actually believes that Russia is the sort of a superpower it was imagined before 2022. We see certainly Russia finding the way to deal with the sanctions, but we don't see certainly Russia as an economic power with any sort of a future.

Well, we are now in Russia certainly trying to regain its military strength, but no one actually believes that Russia is the sort of a superpower it was imagined before 2022. We see certainly Russia finding the way to deal with the sanctions, but we don't see certainly Russia as an economic power with any sort of a future.

Well, we are now in Russia certainly trying to regain its military strength, but no one actually believes that Russia is the sort of a superpower it was imagined before 2022. We see certainly Russia finding the way to deal with the sanctions, but we don't see certainly Russia as an economic power with any sort of a future.

It is not an implosion of the Russian military, economic, and political power, but it's significantly, actually, it is diminished. Today, very difficult to imagine Russia emerging as another pole of the of the multipolar world. Not impossible, but the war certainly made that very problematic and much more difficult.

It is not an implosion of the Russian military, economic, and political power, but it's significantly, actually, it is diminished. Today, very difficult to imagine Russia emerging as another pole of the of the multipolar world. Not impossible, but the war certainly made that very problematic and much more difficult.

It is not an implosion of the Russian military, economic, and political power, but it's significantly, actually, it is diminished. Today, very difficult to imagine Russia emerging as another pole of the of the multipolar world. Not impossible, but the war certainly made that very problematic and much more difficult.

On the other hand, what the war did, it basically awakened the West, the Old West, United States and Western Europe, transatlantic alliance. On the top of that, there are East European countries. that are even much stronger proponents of assistance for Ukraine than is Germany or the United States of America.

On the other hand, what the war did, it basically awakened the West, the Old West, United States and Western Europe, transatlantic alliance. On the top of that, there are East European countries. that are even much stronger proponents of assistance for Ukraine than is Germany or the United States of America.

On the other hand, what the war did, it basically awakened the West, the Old West, United States and Western Europe, transatlantic alliance. On the top of that, there are East European countries. that are even much stronger proponents of assistance for Ukraine than is Germany or the United States of America.

It is the replay of the Cold War story, The Return of the West, that one of the chapters in my book, The Russo-Ukrainian War, is called that way. We also can see the elements of the rebuilding of the Beijing-Moscow alliance of the 1950s, which was a very important part of the Cold War. It was an extremely important part of the Korean War that in many ways launched also the Cold War globally.

It is the replay of the Cold War story, The Return of the West, that one of the chapters in my book, The Russo-Ukrainian War, is called that way. We also can see the elements of the rebuilding of the Beijing-Moscow alliance of the 1950s, which was a very important part of the Cold War. It was an extremely important part of the Korean War that in many ways launched also the Cold War globally.

It is the replay of the Cold War story, The Return of the West, that one of the chapters in my book, The Russo-Ukrainian War, is called that way. We also can see the elements of the rebuilding of the Beijing-Moscow alliance of the 1950s, which was a very important part of the Cold War. It was an extremely important part of the Korean War that in many ways launched also the Cold War globally.