Shashank Joshi

We're going to spend it on Asia, confront China, put more stuff into Japan, put more stuff into South Korea. That kind of makes sense. I may not agree with that, but I see the internal logic of that. However, however, it's a big but. This assumes this is a normal administration that does strategy where people, you and I sit in a room and discuss strategy and produce documents.

What happens when the president puts out a video saying, you know that strategy you said about pivoting to Asia? I just want to put this AI video out showing you a giant golden statue of myself in Gaza because I want to own Gaza. And Then at that point, there is no sense of strategy. It's a sense of whimsy. It's a kind of, you know, the Emperor Caligula making his horse the consul.

What happens when the president puts out a video saying, you know that strategy you said about pivoting to Asia? I just want to put this AI video out showing you a giant golden statue of myself in Gaza because I want to own Gaza. And Then at that point, there is no sense of strategy. It's a sense of whimsy. It's a kind of, you know, the Emperor Caligula making his horse the consul.

What happens when the president puts out a video saying, you know that strategy you said about pivoting to Asia? I just want to put this AI video out showing you a giant golden statue of myself in Gaza because I want to own Gaza. And Then at that point, there is no sense of strategy. It's a sense of whimsy. It's a kind of, you know, the Emperor Caligula making his horse the consul.

It's a sense of governance by presidential impulse. And there, I think, I'm afraid I can't offer a coherent view of strategy other than a raw assertion of American power, regardless of the costs or consequences or benefits.

It's a sense of governance by presidential impulse. And there, I think, I'm afraid I can't offer a coherent view of strategy other than a raw assertion of American power, regardless of the costs or consequences or benefits.

It's a sense of governance by presidential impulse. And there, I think, I'm afraid I can't offer a coherent view of strategy other than a raw assertion of American power, regardless of the costs or consequences or benefits.

I think you need two things from Washington. If this is a tripwire force, that is, say, if the Russians attack it, then it triggers a broader intervention. You need the political backing of America, that it has your back. That's fundamental. But more specifically, you need a number of other capabilities. Air cover is one of them.

I think you need two things from Washington. If this is a tripwire force, that is, say, if the Russians attack it, then it triggers a broader intervention. You need the political backing of America, that it has your back. That's fundamental. But more specifically, you need a number of other capabilities. Air cover is one of them.

I think you need two things from Washington. If this is a tripwire force, that is, say, if the Russians attack it, then it triggers a broader intervention. You need the political backing of America, that it has your back. That's fundamental. But more specifically, you need a number of other capabilities. Air cover is one of them.

You don't want to have to be doing this under threat from Russian air attack, Russian glide bombs, if they're within range of those, Russian long-range missiles. So you would need air cover. You would need air defenses, ground-based air defenses, which we have in small numbers in Europe, but not in adequate numbers across Europe for the scale of this front.

You don't want to have to be doing this under threat from Russian air attack, Russian glide bombs, if they're within range of those, Russian long-range missiles. So you would need air cover. You would need air defenses, ground-based air defenses, which we have in small numbers in Europe, but not in adequate numbers across Europe for the scale of this front.

You don't want to have to be doing this under threat from Russian air attack, Russian glide bombs, if they're within range of those, Russian long-range missiles. So you would need air cover. You would need air defenses, ground-based air defenses, which we have in small numbers in Europe, but not in adequate numbers across Europe for the scale of this front.

And you would need a host of other enablers. I'm talking here about things like intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance planes, logistics, electronic warfare, all kinds of things. It's a long list, but you need America to do those. Otherwise, your forces are exposed to Russian military capabilities.

And you would need a host of other enablers. I'm talking here about things like intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance planes, logistics, electronic warfare, all kinds of things. It's a long list, but you need America to do those. Otherwise, your forces are exposed to Russian military capabilities.

And you would need a host of other enablers. I'm talking here about things like intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance planes, logistics, electronic warfare, all kinds of things. It's a long list, but you need America to do those. Otherwise, your forces are exposed to Russian military capabilities.

Correct. And that depends on the purpose, though. If your purpose is simply to put a symbolic force, an assurance force in the rear of Ukraine, somewhere in western Ukraine, perhaps doing training, perhaps helping with other tasks, freeing up Ukrainian troops to go to the front, you can do that in a more limited way. But that kind of force isn't going to deter the Russians from attacking again.

Correct. And that depends on the purpose, though. If your purpose is simply to put a symbolic force, an assurance force in the rear of Ukraine, somewhere in western Ukraine, perhaps doing training, perhaps helping with other tasks, freeing up Ukrainian troops to go to the front, you can do that in a more limited way. But that kind of force isn't going to deter the Russians from attacking again.

Correct. And that depends on the purpose, though. If your purpose is simply to put a symbolic force, an assurance force in the rear of Ukraine, somewhere in western Ukraine, perhaps doing training, perhaps helping with other tasks, freeing up Ukrainian troops to go to the front, you can do that in a more limited way. But that kind of force isn't going to deter the Russians from attacking again.

If you have a tripwire force like we do presently in Eastern Europe, the so-called enhanced forward presence battle groups, there's about eight of them I think strung out from Estonia to Romania, then absolutely it needs American support. No Europeans are going to take the risk of a force like that without American backing. That's just a fact.