Shashank Joshi

If you have a tripwire force like we do presently in Eastern Europe, the so-called enhanced forward presence battle groups, there's about eight of them I think strung out from Estonia to Romania, then absolutely it needs American support. No Europeans are going to take the risk of a force like that without American backing. That's just a fact.

If you have a tripwire force like we do presently in Eastern Europe, the so-called enhanced forward presence battle groups, there's about eight of them I think strung out from Estonia to Romania, then absolutely it needs American support. No Europeans are going to take the risk of a force like that without American backing. That's just a fact.

I must say, there are accidental cable cuttings. There's, you know, it's 100 cable faults each year on average. Many of those are anchor draggings, fishing vessels.

I must say, there are accidental cable cuttings. There's, you know, it's 100 cable faults each year on average. Many of those are anchor draggings, fishing vessels.

But what makes these cases more interesting is, of course, the year we've just had of continual Russian sabotage across Europe, the fact that these ships appear to be taking slightly irregular routes over these cables, and of course, the fact that in this particular case, the ship in question, the Eagle S, seems to have a connection to Russia's so-called shadow fleet of tankers.

But what makes these cases more interesting is, of course, the year we've just had of continual Russian sabotage across Europe, the fact that these ships appear to be taking slightly irregular routes over these cables, and of course, the fact that in this particular case, the ship in question, the Eagle S, seems to have a connection to Russia's so-called shadow fleet of tankers.

All of that together means, I think, there will be strong grounds to suspect a degree of Russian involvement here.

All of that together means, I think, there will be strong grounds to suspect a degree of Russian involvement here.

That's the other thing. Yeah, we did see a case a few weeks ago, the Yipeng, the Chinese flagship, which was taken into Swedish waters. There were investigators on board, but they were highly constrained by what they could see by the permission of the Chinese. They didn't give full permissions. And they didn't board the ship in international waters in the way that's been done now.

That's the other thing. Yeah, we did see a case a few weeks ago, the Yipeng, the Chinese flagship, which was taken into Swedish waters. There were investigators on board, but they were highly constrained by what they could see by the permission of the Chinese. They didn't give full permissions. And they didn't board the ship in international waters in the way that's been done now.

So this is a clearly more aggressive approach by Finland, which thinks, hang on a minute, the ship has clearly done something we need to investigate. The problem, of course, is you can get on board, you can talk to the crew. It's very, very difficult to prove malign intent unless you have some kind of other intelligence indicating what the instructions given to the captain were.

So this is a clearly more aggressive approach by Finland, which thinks, hang on a minute, the ship has clearly done something we need to investigate. The problem, of course, is you can get on board, you can talk to the crew. It's very, very difficult to prove malign intent unless you have some kind of other intelligence indicating what the instructions given to the captain were.

It's very hard to prove that they dragged their anchor on purpose to cut the cable rather than by accident.

It's very hard to prove that they dragged their anchor on purpose to cut the cable rather than by accident.

As vulnerable as others. Of course, the Baltic cables lie in different depths, different geographies. Russia has maybe an easier time there. But if you look at our geography, we have many, many energy, power, electricity, data cables connecting us not only to the continent, but also across the Atlantic.

As vulnerable as others. Of course, the Baltic cables lie in different depths, different geographies. Russia has maybe an easier time there. But if you look at our geography, we have many, many energy, power, electricity, data cables connecting us not only to the continent, but also across the Atlantic.

Russian submarines, particularly a unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense called Gugi, a deep sea water activity unit, has been active in those areas as well, including with their submarines. It would be difficult to cut the UK off. There's far too many data cables connecting us to too many different places. But you could cause localised disruption to power or data with well-targeted action.

Russian submarines, particularly a unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense called Gugi, a deep sea water activity unit, has been active in those areas as well, including with their submarines. It would be difficult to cut the UK off. There's far too many data cables connecting us to too many different places. But you could cause localised disruption to power or data with well-targeted action.

And of course, that's the point of this kind of sabotage. That was The Economist's defence editor, Shashank Joshi.

And of course, that's the point of this kind of sabotage. That was The Economist's defence editor, Shashank Joshi.