Shyam Sankar

And that's why we struggle with it. Like, how much should the taxpayer keep dumping into these shipyards? The answer is always more, but we're getting less for our money every single time. And the way out of this problem is to realize that monopsony, the government as a sole buyer, is actually the problem. That's how we got into this problem to begin with.

The world used to be very different when the Berlin Wall still stood, just came down. Only 6% of major weapons system spending went to defense specialists. The other 94% went to what I call as dual purpose companies. Too much is said about dual use. A missile is single use. You need Palmer to build lethal effects that only the government is the buyer of. But dual purpose.

The world used to be very different when the Berlin Wall still stood, just came down. Only 6% of major weapons system spending went to defense specialists. The other 94% went to what I call as dual purpose companies. Too much is said about dual use. A missile is single use. You need Palmer to build lethal effects that only the government is the buyer of. But dual purpose.

The world used to be very different when the Berlin Wall still stood, just came down. Only 6% of major weapons system spending went to defense specialists. The other 94% went to what I call as dual purpose companies. Too much is said about dual use. A missile is single use. You need Palmer to build lethal effects that only the government is the buyer of. But dual purpose.

Chrysler used to build cars and missiles. Ford built satellites until 1990. General Mills, the cereal company, built torpedoes and inertial guidance systems in their mechanics division. No shit. Everything they learned about building machinery to process cereal, they were able to leverage in the service of national security to make our war fighters more lethal.

Chrysler used to build cars and missiles. Ford built satellites until 1990. General Mills, the cereal company, built torpedoes and inertial guidance systems in their mechanics division. No shit. Everything they learned about building machinery to process cereal, they were able to leverage in the service of national security to make our war fighters more lethal.

Chrysler used to build cars and missiles. Ford built satellites until 1990. General Mills, the cereal company, built torpedoes and inertial guidance systems in their mechanics division. No shit. Everything they learned about building machinery to process cereal, they were able to leverage in the service of national security to make our war fighters more lethal.

And what happened was that over time, the government became such a difficult buyer to work with. All sorts of esoteric rules that only matter for the government, all sorts of auditing, all sorts of bureaucracy, that people tried to figure out how to exit that business. And that started in the 70s. Boardrooms started talking about it. It accelerated in the 80s.

And what happened was that over time, the government became such a difficult buyer to work with. All sorts of esoteric rules that only matter for the government, all sorts of auditing, all sorts of bureaucracy, that people tried to figure out how to exit that business. And that started in the 70s. Boardrooms started talking about it. It accelerated in the 80s.

And what happened was that over time, the government became such a difficult buyer to work with. All sorts of esoteric rules that only matter for the government, all sorts of auditing, all sorts of bureaucracy, that people tried to figure out how to exit that business. And that started in the 70s. Boardrooms started talking about it. It accelerated in the 80s.

And then when the Last Supper happened in 1993, there was this dinner in the Pentagon. We used to have 51 major defense primes. Well, they got the 15 largest together, they had a dinner and they said, we need a peace dividend, we've won the Cold War, we're gonna slash defense spending. So for every dollar we used to spend, we're gonna spend 33 cents and it's gonna happen all at once.

And then when the Last Supper happened in 1993, there was this dinner in the Pentagon. We used to have 51 major defense primes. Well, they got the 15 largest together, they had a dinner and they said, we need a peace dividend, we've won the Cold War, we're gonna slash defense spending. So for every dollar we used to spend, we're gonna spend 33 cents and it's gonna happen all at once.

And then when the Last Supper happened in 1993, there was this dinner in the Pentagon. We used to have 51 major defense primes. Well, they got the 15 largest together, they had a dinner and they said, we need a peace dividend, we've won the Cold War, we're gonna slash defense spending. So for every dollar we used to spend, we're gonna spend 33 cents and it's gonna happen all at once.

you guys are not all going to survive. You have our permission to consolidate, to merge, to try to find commercial lines of business, like do what you need to do. And we let that happen until 1999 when we blocked the merger of Lockheed and Northrop. That was the last, we said, okay, this is too much. So we went from 51 down to five. The popular narrative. What are the five?

you guys are not all going to survive. You have our permission to consolidate, to merge, to try to find commercial lines of business, like do what you need to do. And we let that happen until 1999 when we blocked the merger of Lockheed and Northrop. That was the last, we said, okay, this is too much. So we went from 51 down to five. The popular narrative. What are the five?

you guys are not all going to survive. You have our permission to consolidate, to merge, to try to find commercial lines of business, like do what you need to do. And we let that happen until 1999 when we blocked the merger of Lockheed and Northrop. That was the last, we said, okay, this is too much. So we went from 51 down to five. The popular narrative. What are the five?

Northrop, Lockheed, GD, Boeing, and Raytheon. The popular narrative is this is when we lost competition in the industrial base. 51 down to five, you have less people to pick from. That definitely happened, but I don't think it's the dominant problem. The dominant problem is really that the consolidation bred conformity.

Northrop, Lockheed, GD, Boeing, and Raytheon. The popular narrative is this is when we lost competition in the industrial base. 51 down to five, you have less people to pick from. That definitely happened, but I don't think it's the dominant problem. The dominant problem is really that the consolidation bred conformity.

Northrop, Lockheed, GD, Boeing, and Raytheon. The popular narrative is this is when we lost competition in the industrial base. 51 down to five, you have less people to pick from. That definitely happened, but I don't think it's the dominant problem. The dominant problem is really that the consolidation bred conformity.

You had companies that were almost like test tube babies, artificial mergers, no single unified culture. They became essentially almost like state-owned enterprises, extensions of the government, just doing the government's bidding. There was not enough heresy, not enough crazy ideas that pushed the envelope, not enough Kelly Johnsons of the world. It drove out the founders.