Steve Ballmer

I would say two things were true at the time for us. And this is specifically about mobile. it's also about something else. It's a little bit out of search too. There are two things that are true. Number one, you have to be focusing consciously on the issue. It's easy to get caught up in, you know, there's innovators dilemma. It's a little different, but you get caught up in what you have.

You get caught up in what you know. You get caught up in the capabilities. And that's why I say to myself, you explicitly have to think about it. And look, if we hadn't developed a bunch of capabilities we had, AI, if we hadn't built Bing, company wouldn't have capability.

You get caught up in what you know. You get caught up in the capabilities. And that's why I say to myself, you explicitly have to think about it. And look, if we hadn't developed a bunch of capabilities we had, AI, if we hadn't built Bing, company wouldn't have capability.

We built some important capabilities, but we didn't realize the businesses were enough different to harness those in the new ways. I'm proud of the capabilities we built. Didn't apply them the way we should have. Where did we learn to build internet scale infrastructure? Well, some with Azure, some even more than Azure. Bing and Xbox. No, even more than Azure to get started.

We built some important capabilities, but we didn't realize the businesses were enough different to harness those in the new ways. I'm proud of the capabilities we built. Didn't apply them the way we should have. Where did we learn to build internet scale infrastructure? Well, some with Azure, some even more than Azure. Bing and Xbox. No, even more than Azure to get started.

The Office, what's now M365, the Office backend, because that got critical mass as a cloud infrastructure before Azure did, and even more so with Bing. So we developed the capabilities, but then you look at the product and what was our strategy for Bing? Well, there's too much based upon Windows integration.

The Office, what's now M365, the Office backend, because that got critical mass as a cloud infrastructure before Azure did, and even more so with Bing. So we developed the capabilities, but then you look at the product and what was our strategy for Bing? Well, there's too much based upon Windows integration.

Windows Live Search, right? Everything was Windows Live. OneDrive was now OneDrive. You're not going to beat Google with Windows Live. But the file sharing. I mean, look, Google's done the same thing. And you've got to ask, where do you run out of gas?

Windows Live Search, right? Everything was Windows Live. OneDrive was now OneDrive. You're not going to beat Google with Windows Live. But the file sharing. I mean, look, Google's done the same thing. And you've got to ask, where do you run out of gas?

88, yeah. And we jumped in in 2003, I think we pushed. Now, you'd say five years is a lot, or you could say five years isn't that much. You could say we had no birthright. I mean, it's just a completely separate thing. We had no capability. We had nobody who'd grown up in that world. And we had some guys in Microsoft Research who could sort of start getting us there.

88, yeah. And we jumped in in 2003, I think we pushed. Now, you'd say five years is a lot, or you could say five years isn't that much. You could say we had no birthright. I mean, it's just a completely separate thing. We had no capability. We had nobody who'd grown up in that world. And we had some guys in Microsoft Research who could sort of start getting us there.

We took talent that was doing other things in Microsoft. It's hard to go get new talent because search is brand new. There were people from Inc. to me. Google had sort of sucked them up. So it took us a while to get off the ground. It took us a while even, to be fair.

We took talent that was doing other things in Microsoft. It's hard to go get new talent because search is brand new. There were people from Inc. to me. Google had sort of sucked them up. So it took us a while to get off the ground. It took us a while even, to be fair.

I think this is something both Bill and I debated, not just with each other, but just we kicked around too much how much, quote, the verticals in online services would be important versus search and portal is generic. So search and portal is generic. But remember, we had a thing called Expedia. We built a travel site. We built a local information site called Sidewalk. We had a car shopping site.

I think this is something both Bill and I debated, not just with each other, but just we kicked around too much how much, quote, the verticals in online services would be important versus search and portal is generic. So search and portal is generic. But remember, we had a thing called Expedia. We built a travel site. We built a local information site called Sidewalk. We had a car shopping site.

What did we call that thing? Carpoint. How much would the verticals be worth? And there was one vertical that mattered, except it wasn't really vertical. It's called all shopping. There was all information and all shopping. And you got Google and Amazon. And doing all these detailed, specific things. Remember, we did a portal. We did that. And then eventually, then we did search a few years later.

What did we call that thing? Carpoint. How much would the verticals be worth? And there was one vertical that mattered, except it wasn't really vertical. It's called all shopping. There was all information and all shopping. And you got Google and Amazon. And doing all these detailed, specific things. Remember, we did a portal. We did that. And then eventually, then we did search a few years later.

We were just off. We had the wrong thing stack ranked in the wrong way, my opinion, with 20-20 hindsight. And we were spread too thin. So he said, when should you get into a new thing? Well, you probably shouldn't get into five new things if you really only have the talent for one, two new things. That's number one. Scott McNeely, his son, used to have this expression.

We were just off. We had the wrong thing stack ranked in the wrong way, my opinion, with 20-20 hindsight. And we were spread too thin. So he said, when should you get into a new thing? Well, you probably shouldn't get into five new things if you really only have the talent for one, two new things. That's number one. Scott McNeely, his son, used to have this expression.

He goes, we got to get all our wood behind one arrow. You know, it's nice to try, I mean, I was listening to you guys talk about Amazon and how they, okay, we're going to try small things, but they also put in small cost structure. We put in big cost structure because we were already all in when we got into something. And so in this particular case, a few years later, and then what do you do?