Steve Ballmer

Um... Two or three things. Number one, the phone was very on my brain. When you said, are you having fun? That was the thing that was eating at me the most was the phone. And I decided we needed to flip the model around. Your episode's pretty good about all that happened, so I'm not going to go through all that. But I knew we had to do hard work. I knew it. There was just no question.

We weren't going to be able to play the search game, the Android slash search game, because we just didn't have the power of monetization that they did. And Apple's Apple, but they're going to be two phones. It's not like there'd only be one phone that was popular in the world. And this is something you guys didn't put in the episode.

We weren't going to be able to play the search game, the Android slash search game, because we just didn't have the power of monetization that they did. And Apple's Apple, but they're going to be two phones. It's not like there'd only be one phone that was popular in the world. And this is something you guys didn't put in the episode.

I had talked about buying a phone company for years, a number of years, before the Nokia deal. I forget what year it was. I flew to Taiwan and we were looking at buying HTC. They were the biggest Windows Phone OEM at the time. Nokia wasn't signed up. I finally just decided, Terry Meyers and I, we had three, four trips to Taiwan to talk to Peter, look at the organization.

I had talked about buying a phone company for years, a number of years, before the Nokia deal. I forget what year it was. I flew to Taiwan and we were looking at buying HTC. They were the biggest Windows Phone OEM at the time. Nokia wasn't signed up. I finally just decided, Terry Meyers and I, we had three, four trips to Taiwan to talk to Peter, look at the organization.

And I just decided it would be too tough to buy a Taiwanese company. That it would be, I would worry too much about the integration. I liked Peter Cho who ran HDC. I don't know if that name means anything to you guys. Yeah, of course. But I'd been looking at that thing for two or three years maybe before.

And I just decided it would be too tough to buy a Taiwanese company. That it would be, I would worry too much about the integration. I liked Peter Cho who ran HDC. I don't know if that name means anything to you guys. Yeah, of course. But I'd been looking at that thing for two or three years maybe before.

And, you know, Bill and I had all continued to have all the tension we had about anything that had hardware in it. Uh, so, you know, it's not like our relationship was calm and it's, it's clear it had, it had always been bumpy. I mean, even back to the beginning, I almost quit after four weeks because we were in it. Five weeks, maybe. So it's not like it had ever been linear.

And, you know, Bill and I had all continued to have all the tension we had about anything that had hardware in it. Uh, so, you know, it's not like our relationship was calm and it's, it's clear it had, it had always been bumpy. I mean, even back to the beginning, I almost quit after four weeks because we were in it. Five weeks, maybe. So it's not like it had ever been linear.

That would have been a very poor economic decision.

That would have been a very poor economic decision.

We had another big fight a year after about financial stuff. So it had never been linear. It had been, it had helped build Microsoft, but that didn't mean it had always been easy for him or me. So the hardware thing was exacerbating our relationship. I thought we really needed to do a phone. And then the board said, no, we don't want to do a phone. And I was very transparent with everybody.

We had another big fight a year after about financial stuff. So it had never been linear. It had been, it had helped build Microsoft, but that didn't mean it had always been easy for him or me. So the hardware thing was exacerbating our relationship. I thought we really needed to do a phone. And then the board said, no, we don't want to do a phone. And I was very transparent with everybody.

Okay, here's. You know, we brought the manager. You got this right. We brought the management team in. And I don't know if it was more wanted to buy or didn't want. But I let everybody speak. I mean, it's a big decision to be in the phone hardware business. And then the process from we do the presentation. And the process from there to the time the board says no, I didn't find very respectful.

Okay, here's. You know, we brought the manager. You got this right. We brought the management team in. And I don't know if it was more wanted to buy or didn't want. But I let everybody speak. I mean, it's a big decision to be in the phone hardware business. And then the process from we do the presentation. And the process from there to the time the board says no, I didn't find very respectful.

Right. The board didn't ask me to leave. The board, I just didn't find the process very respectful. And I probably won't go into the detail of that. And a lot of it has to do, again, with my relationship with Bill. And look, I knew Bill didn't love the idea. And I was willing to sort of accept whatever the board decided. I was. No question about that. But the process wasn't very good.

Right. The board didn't ask me to leave. The board, I just didn't find the process very respectful. And I probably won't go into the detail of that. And a lot of it has to do, again, with my relationship with Bill. And look, I knew Bill didn't love the idea. And I was willing to sort of accept whatever the board decided. I was. No question about that. But the process wasn't very good.

And I was not happy with the process. But they wanted me to stay. I just decided two things. If we're not going to buy phones, that's kind of my best shot. for a consumer future for the company. Right now, that's my best shot. And I tried to fire the Yahoo shot, the phone shot. Those were my two things, remember, mobile and search. And so I said, look, this might be the right time.

And I was not happy with the process. But they wanted me to stay. I just decided two things. If we're not going to buy phones, that's kind of my best shot. for a consumer future for the company. Right now, that's my best shot. And I tried to fire the Yahoo shot, the phone shot. Those were my two things, remember, mobile and search. And so I said, look, this might be the right time.

We can't make my play here. Not out of pique. It's just, hey, I thought about this in advance and said, look, if it doesn't work, it doesn't work. If the board doesn't want to do it, fine. And so I said, this is a good time. It's also a good time because the cloud's just coming on. And I'm saying to myself, look, we're going to have to build new capabilities.