Steve Bunting

And then in between them was our camp.

So we had a MSAT.

8123, and then we had an ANSOF team with us too, an ANASF team of commandos with us.

And then next to us, we had an Afghan National Army camp, which was kind of terrifying, man.

I mean, honestly, I was more worried about what was on the other side of the HESCO than the Taliban because it was just another, it was probably a company of Afghan National Army and they were always squirrely, always just doing weird stuff.

And it was just, you know, and plus with all the green on blue type stuff happening, you know, we had so many MARSOC guys die from their partner nation forces turning on them.

It was, there was high anxiety, man.

There was high anxiety.

Like you just had to keep your head on a swivel and you knew that no matter what, it wasn't safe.

Yeah.

Yeah.

So...

What was the op tempo?

Yeah, the op tempo was a little bit slower, right?

Because the CJ SOTIF and the SOTIF was like really risk adverse at this time.

I think there was kind of thoughts that we're going to start de-mailing and pulling out.

And the idea of like stacking a bunch of casualties probably wasn't high on their priority list.

But luckily for us, the Taliban didn't care what the SOTIF thought.

Right.

So, you know, a lot of times we were prepping for ops and then for whatever reason they would, they would try to decline it.