Steve Saretsky

Right.

So there is the prospect of making Canadians less safe if some of these companies withdraw some of those kinds of services.

But to your point, you've then got different classes of other services like VPNs that say, our whole model is based on not collecting and retaining metadata.

It is based on encryption.

And if your position is, we've got to retain metadata and potentially create backdoors by breaking encryption, well, then we can't continue to operate here.

Yeah.

So I would exclude Germany from this.

I do think if we're in what's known as the Five Eyes, so that's five countries that have active cooperation with respect to signals intelligence.

So that would include the UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

In that instance...

There is active cooperation and it becomes a bit of a one-way ratchet where one country says, this is what we're going to do now.

And so then the other countries say, well, okay, we've got to keep pace and got to ensure that our investigators have some of the same powers and that we can interoperate.

So that's part of what's driving at least that on the security side.

But you are right to highlight some of the other jurisdictions that have been more actively involved, if not necessarily on this specific issue, but more on the Internet regulation issue.

And.

You know, listen, there are real harms that take place.

I don't think anybody would take issue with that.

The question is, how do you find ways to strike an appropriate balance?

And on this instance, it feels like oftentimes politicians are just responding to either a public demand or what they think will sell.

You know, we're seeing this play out in the online harm space.