Tim Fist

So this was a treaty that was signed to try and prevent like a whole category of nuclear weapons from existing, which were those with flight times of less than 10 minutes.

Because that is extremely dangerous, you don't have much warning, you could sort of like attack immediately.

And so this was primarily targeted at launches that were located in Europe, between sort of like Europe and the USSR.

And this treaty was actually enabled by an X-ray scanning technology.

This was called CargoScan, which they placed this technology, the US and the Soviet Union developed this together and deployed it at Soviet missile factories.

And what this technology did is for every single rail car that was coming out of this missile factory, that was scanned by this X-ray machine to measure the diameter of the missile to ensure that it was not one of these intermediate range missiles that have a flight time of less than 10 minutes.

This is cited as the key thing that actually made this treaty around this kind of nuclear weapon possible.

So the existence of that X-ray technology made it such that we could put in place this agreement that we wanted to have.

Exactly.

And the interesting thing about this is that the reason that they used x-rays as opposed to other kinds of scanning techniques is it gave enough information to measure the diameter of the missile, but not other parts of the design of the missile, which were seen as sensitive secrets that the Soviet Union wanted to keep secure.

And so this is also an example of a technology that was deployed that was sufficiently privacy-preserving such that both parties were happy sharing that information.

Yeah, totally.

I think the US and China are both worried about models with the cyber attack, cyber offensive capabilities of mythos falling into the hands of criminal or terrorist actors.

Obviously, there's like big consequences for the global financial system and shared infrastructure if these models are misused.

And I do think that

there's that sort of like talking about like misuse by non-state actors and that there's the coordinated slowdown that labs are talking about.

And I think that these could in principle, and I'm sure we'll get into this in more detail, but these could in principle share a lot of the same underlying verification technology in a way that today's moment around mythos could be really used productively in the future if we want that optionality.

Yeah, I guess to sort of restate the principles here, like we've talked about the idea that if you want to do anything serious at the frontier of air development, you need access to a large number of chips.

And so the things that you would want to verify is stuff to do with how are you actually using those chips?

Are you using it for the stuff that we've agreed is good, like alignment research?