Torsten Reil

I struggle to believe we don't understand, Torsten. I think we probably intellectually understood it, but we didn't really want to think through the consequences. Because the consequences were that we needed to start thinking about defence again, about conflict, all the suffering that comes with it, and we didn't want to think about it. We thought it might go away.

And actually that happened for many years afterwards as well, and even to some extent now. And I understand it, I understand it emotionally as well, but I think it's intellectually lazy to not take the next step and think about what actually is required to protect our democracies. Before we go into what's required, what happens from here?

And actually that happened for many years afterwards as well, and even to some extent now. And I understand it, I understand it emotionally as well, but I think it's intellectually lazy to not take the next step and think about what actually is required to protect our democracies. Before we go into what's required, what happens from here?

And actually that happened for many years afterwards as well, and even to some extent now. And I understand it, I understand it emotionally as well, but I think it's intellectually lazy to not take the next step and think about what actually is required to protect our democracies. Before we go into what's required, what happens from here?

The question is whether we're prepared again to think it through and commit to the next steps, which are an increase in defence spending, even if it is expensive, even if that means making sacrifices elsewhere, because the sacrifice that otherwise we'd have to make is potentially so large, it's the right thing to do. That I'm not sure is happening at the moment.

The question is whether we're prepared again to think it through and commit to the next steps, which are an increase in defence spending, even if it is expensive, even if that means making sacrifices elsewhere, because the sacrifice that otherwise we'd have to make is potentially so large, it's the right thing to do. That I'm not sure is happening at the moment.

The question is whether we're prepared again to think it through and commit to the next steps, which are an increase in defence spending, even if it is expensive, even if that means making sacrifices elsewhere, because the sacrifice that otherwise we'd have to make is potentially so large, it's the right thing to do. That I'm not sure is happening at the moment.

I mean, Keir Starmer's actively said we will not have an increase in defence spending. Well, I think most governments are actually committing to an increase over time. So we are at, I think, roughly probably 2% right now on average in NATO. That's quite low historically. It's been, through the Cold War, it's been 3% to 6% or so.

I mean, Keir Starmer's actively said we will not have an increase in defence spending. Well, I think most governments are actually committing to an increase over time. So we are at, I think, roughly probably 2% right now on average in NATO. That's quite low historically. It's been, through the Cold War, it's been 3% to 6% or so.

I mean, Keir Starmer's actively said we will not have an increase in defence spending. Well, I think most governments are actually committing to an increase over time. So we are at, I think, roughly probably 2% right now on average in NATO. That's quite low historically. It's been, through the Cold War, it's been 3% to 6% or so.

But if you look at Poland, Poland has gone from, I think, 2.1% or so to 4.6%, 4.7% within just a few years. So it's clearly possible. Whether every country is going to act at that speed remains to be seen. I think there are budget pressures everywhere. We understand them. And you have to convince a lot of people to actually rechannel so much money towards defence. It's not easy. I get that.

But if you look at Poland, Poland has gone from, I think, 2.1% or so to 4.6%, 4.7% within just a few years. So it's clearly possible. Whether every country is going to act at that speed remains to be seen. I think there are budget pressures everywhere. We understand them. And you have to convince a lot of people to actually rechannel so much money towards defence. It's not easy. I get that.

But if you look at Poland, Poland has gone from, I think, 2.1% or so to 4.6%, 4.7% within just a few years. So it's clearly possible. Whether every country is going to act at that speed remains to be seen. I think there are budget pressures everywhere. We understand them. And you have to convince a lot of people to actually rechannel so much money towards defence. It's not easy. I get that.

But I think it's going to happen.

But I think it's going to happen.

But I think it's going to happen.

Yeah, I think we've already been on that trajectory, I think starting from 2016, where obviously similar arguments were being made. And with the Ukraine conflict, defence spending has gone up, you know, sometimes part of the general budget, sometimes as part of separate budgets, like in Germany, the 100 billion. So that's already happening.

Yeah, I think we've already been on that trajectory, I think starting from 2016, where obviously similar arguments were being made. And with the Ukraine conflict, defence spending has gone up, you know, sometimes part of the general budget, sometimes as part of separate budgets, like in Germany, the 100 billion. So that's already happening.

Yeah, I think we've already been on that trajectory, I think starting from 2016, where obviously similar arguments were being made. And with the Ukraine conflict, defence spending has gone up, you know, sometimes part of the general budget, sometimes as part of separate budgets, like in Germany, the 100 billion. So that's already happening.

I think the need for European sovereignty has clearly become even more important. So I think we're just going to go further down on that vector. It might just be that we're going to have to go faster. the need for European sovereignty has become more important. Can you explain that to me?