Chapter 1: What is the main topic discussed in this episode?
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Just click the link in the episode description and vote for three takeaways. It really makes a difference. All right, let's dive in. Who is actually winning right now, the United States or Iran? Or is that the wrong question? Hi, everyone. I'm Lynne Thoman, and this is Three Takeaways.
On Three Takeaways, I talk with some of the world's best thinkers, business leaders, writers, politicians, newsmakers, and scientists. Each episode ends with three key takeaways to help us understand the world and maybe even ourselves a little better. Today, I'm delighted to be with Elliott Abrams. He served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor.
He also served as Special Representative for Iran. He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Welcome, Elliott, and thanks so much for joining Three Takeaways today.
Thank you. It's my pleasure.
It is my pleasure. And thank you for your service in government as well. Thanks. Who do you think has the upper hand, the United States or Iran and why?
Right now, I'd say it's a draw. It's a war, so you can't say it doesn't matter who's winning or that it's wrong to think about winning. But it seems to me that there's a lot of damage done to Iran militarily and economically and to its leadership. They do have this asset of the state of Hormuz, but I really don't think they're going to be able to keep hold of that asset for very many more days.
I will come back and ask you more about the Strait of Hormuz in a minute. What has Iran actually gained from this conflict?
I don't think they've gained anything. I think they've lost a lot. Not only in the war directly, but they've gained, if you will, the hatred of their Gulf Arab neighbors. They've gained one thing, I guess, which is they've been able to show that they have the ability, at least for a while, to close the Strait of Hormuz, which people hadn't thought much about before.
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Chapter 2: What visible threats does Iran pose to global oil supply?
Secondly, a blow to our economy, at least temporarily, through the rising gas prices. Third, and this is not a necessary element of the war, but it's happened because of the president's handling of the Europeans. It has cost us a significant downturn in our relations with our European allies. And it has left a feeling, I think, around the world of unreliable leadership in the United States.
because the United States did not advise or consult or involve any other country.
No, I think, you know, you can make an argument that secrecy required that we'd be quite circumspect in talking to allies. I think it's more the way in which the president and other secretary of war spoke about the war. The president's threat to destroy Iranian civilization, for example, whatever that meant. the apparent lack of what we would used to call, anyway, a policy process.
It seems as if policy is being made by a very small group of people. And that has some benefits, of course, in terms of secrecy, but it means that a careful look at options and dangers around the corner was probably absent.
Iran didn't just focus on Israel. It struck across the region. What was the strategy, do you think, behind widening the battlefield?
The only strategy that makes sense to me is that damage being done to the Gulf allies of the United States would lead them immediately to rush to Washington and say, stop it. Stop the war immediately. That did not happen, but it was not a crazy idea in the minds of Iranian leaders.
but it has set many of the neighboring Arab countries against Iran.
Yeah, I think it backfired. I think that certainly the Qataris and the Omanis who had spent a lot of time and energy establishing decent relations with Iran must have been shocked to be hit. Their greatest single piece of damage was the damage to an LNG facility in Qatar.
which apparently cannot be repaired for five years, and which will do something like diminish by 20% the amount of LNG they can export. And this is a country which I think no one would have called an enemy of Iran. So I think that it backfired and they, at least in some cases, have been saying to the United States government, this regime in Tehran is too dangerous.
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Chapter 3: What has Iran gained or lost from its recent conflicts?
Why is the IRGC part of that You know, I guess I'd say if you think of the old Soviet Union, that role was played essentially by the KGB and the Communist Party. This is a regime, in essence, without a Communist Party. So it's the IRGC that is, I think, the central nervous system of the regime.
And did they also have a hold through payments?
Yes.
Yes. For example, there's a lot of corruption, which they're not really attempting to stamp out. It seems to be a feature rather than a bug. And the same is true, I would say, of the clergy. That is, to be an Ayatollah is a way to live well. And there's a lot of money that goes into the religious structures, including a lot of religious foundations that throw around billions of dollars.
Some of it, no doubt, does some good, helping poor people, for example. But a lot of it, I think, makes for very cushy jobs for people in the clergy, which means you don't want to rock the boat.
And you basically assess the probabilities of a more democratic government in Iran as very, very slim.
Well, I wouldn't say that. I think I'd say first, we can't predict when regimes fall. It would not shock me if the regime fell in a year because we know from the recurrent uprisings that the regime is very, very widely unpopular in the country. But whether the final uprising happens in a year or happens in 10 years, I just think we have no way to know the answer to that.
But for the moment, they seem to be able to control the country. I think what has to add, how did they do that in January? By slaughtering tens of thousands of citizens. If you're willing to do that, and it's an interesting comparison, the Shah in 1979 was not willing to do that to maintain power. But if you are willing to do that... then you're likely to remain in power longer.
How do you assess Iran's nuclear capabilities?
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Chapter 4: How has the war impacted the U.S. and global economy?
That is, I think the 12-day war of 2025 and this more recent war have hit a number of pieces of their nuclear structure, killed a lot of scientists, hit a lot of laboratories, hit pieces of their industrial base that are related to the nuclear program. So I would say today, they're probably years away from the ability to build a nuclear bomb.
Do you believe that this war makes a nuclear Iran more likely or less?
I've heard people say that it's going to persuade the guys running the country, the IRGC people. You see, we really need a nuclear weapon because if we had one, they wouldn't have attacked us this way. That may or may not be true. I mean, Ukraine is attacking the Russians every day. And Russia's a big nuclear power, and it hasn't stopped Ukraine. So it isn't clear that that is a correct view.
But of course, if they hadn't been trying to build a nuclear weapon, they wouldn't have been attacked in the 12-day war, and probably in this war. So I think it's probably right that the people running the country will, if you will, make a mental note, we really have to get a nuclear weapon.
But, you know, after 2003, when we, the United States, invaded Iraq, they put aside their nuclear weapons program for years. They might do that again while Trump is president and just say, look, we'll come back to this. But we have other priorities in the short run. I do think in the long run they want a nuclear weapon. That is the way they've behaved for decades.
But that doesn't mean that they will try to build one immediately.
What other threats should neighboring countries to Iran be most concerned about?
Well, in the short run, the continuation or the enlargement of the kind of attack that Iran did undertake during this war, which were often on civilian targets. That is, they did try to hit military bases, but they also hit the Dubai airport. They did at the very end hit a desalination plant in Kuwait, for example.
Particularly the power plants and desalination plants are quite vulnerable and I think are possible targets for Iran going forward. We also have to worry about their old weapon of choice, terrorism. I would say those are the two major problems. We've already talked about, of course, keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed. But again, I don't think they can do that long term.
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