Tortious Interference and Inter-Creditor Duties Creditors in sovereign debt restructurings often complain about other creditors. And creditors often try to limit what other creditors get (at least indirectly, via most favored nations clauses, comparability of treatment, etc.). Can these efforts sometimes create a risk of liability? Does that risk even extend to official creditors? In the recent Zambian restructuring negotiations, rumor has it that the doctrine of tortious interference with contract was invoked when commercial creditors felt that official creditors were expecting them to make unrealistic sacrifices. Andrew Wilkinson (Weil, which advised the Zambia External Bondholder Steering Committee) joins us to talk about the restructuring of Zambia's debt and the question of inter-creditor duties. Producer: Leanna Doty
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