The Munk Debates Podcast
Friday Focus: Iran flexes its leverage and Ukraine goes on the attack
19 Jun 2026
Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
Chapter 1: What recent events are escalating tensions between Israel and Hezbollah?
You know, Iran is the one that is likely to overestimate and increasingly so as the midterms get closer because Donald Trump needs that straight open. But what about on November 5th and 6th? What happens? Right?
And what will Iran want to try to leverage before November in order to be in a better position after November when they realize their leverage goes away? It's...
A hundred percent.
It'll be interesting to say the least.
That's the 3D chessboard here.
Yeah.
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Chapter 2: How could the ceasefire impact the fragile MOU between Iran and the U.S.?
Welcome to the Friday Focus podcast for the 19th of June, 2026. I'm Roger Griffiths, chair of the Munk Debate, joined by Janice Gross-Stein, the founding director of the Munk School of Global Affairs. Happy Juneteenth, Janice. The U.S., much of it observing this holiday, but we're here in the studio ready to talk about another wild week in
global events from the G7 to the beginnings of this ceasefire. Let's dig right into the news this morning, which is overnight continuing heavy strikes by Israel on southern Lebanon. This is in response to cross-border attacks by Hezbollah. Supposedly, the parties have agreed to yet another ceasefire to come into effect in a matter of hours.
What's going on here and to what degree is this imperiling this very fragile MOU, it seems, between Iran and the United States?
Roger, neither of those two parties, neither Hezbollah nor Israel are parties to that agreement.
Chapter 3: What strategies might Iran employ to leverage its position before the U.S. midterms?
Iran claims that the ceasefire applies to Lebanon and the Trump administration has spoken with conflicting language. It certainly said to Prime Minister Netanyahu, you need to stop the strikes in Lebanon. The president said very colorful language three days ago. But he then said, and his team said, well, yeah, but you have a right to self-defense. So in your introduction,
The scenario here is Hizballah starts by firing missiles and you get these strikes in response, and then Israel claims it has the right to self-defense. This is the weak point of the ceasefire. All ceasefires are problematic, especially in the first 72 hours, but this is clearly the most vulnerable part of the ceasefire.
Chapter 4: How is Benjamin Netanyahu expected to respond to Iran's influence?
So let's unpack this a little bit. I mean, surely Hezbollah is not launching these attacks without some kind of tacit approval from Iran, but Iran is saying that they're holding off on this initial meeting that was supposed to happen today in Switzerland to begin discussing the substance of the MOU. So Iran must be aware
that it's telling Hezbollah that it can take these actions that it knows will cause a counter reaction by Israel, which then it in turn can use, I guess, to lever, is this what this is all about, Janice, about applying leverage to the Americans to show that Iran can control and limit Israel's behavior through the MOU? I mean, is that as brass tacks as we're getting?
I think that's exactly what's going on. You know, there have been a whole series of interviews that the president has given, that Marco Rubio has given, and J.D. Vance has given in the wake of the signing because predictably it's come under withering criticism in the United States. And Trump made one comment, which I think encapsulates it all.
He said, Herbert Hoover is a president I did not want to be. And then he went on to explain. Herbert Hoover, of course, presided over the depression known for his failure, in fact, to mitigate the worst of it. And he said he did not want to be that president who pushed the world into recession as a result of energy prices and energy shortages. The Iranians know, when he speaks this way,
The Iranians know they have leverage. So what are they doing here? They're doing exactly as you said. They're upping the ante. They're not going to move forward unless the strikes against Hezbollah stops. But they do, the Iranians certainly have the capacity to say to Hezbollah, stop the firing of the rockets across the border into Israel. And they're not. giving those instructions to Hezbollah.
Hezbollah is not doing this without talking to Iran. There's no way.
Fascinating. It is a chess game. Let's go to the other man of the hour, Benjamin Netanyahu. How does he respond to this, Janice? Because if it's as clear as you and I think it is, that this is, in a sense, Iran kind of flexing the MOU, its leverage over the United States, to curb and limit and delineate Israeli behavior vis-a-vis, you could say, charitably from
an Iranian-Lebanese perspective to respect the sovereignty and sanctity and territorial integrity of Lebanon.
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Chapter 5: What developments emerged from the recent G7 meeting regarding Russia?
From a cynical perspective, you could say to demonstrate some raw Iranian power to basically limit and prescribe what Israel can and can't do in a very specific situation such as these cross-border attacks. What does Benjamin Netanyahu, how does he respond to this? It seems impossible to imagine that Israel would allow itself to have its hard-won post-October 7th
kind of the credibility of its offensive and deterrent capacity suddenly limited and curtailed by Iran in this surreptitious manner.
I think the prime minister is in the worst, let's just talk domestic politics for one moment, in the worst political position he's ever been in his career. You know, we have heard the scathing criticism that is coming from some elements in the Republican Party in the United States.
It's far worse in Israel, though, is it not?
Far worse, far worse. And traditional supporters of the prime minister, media outlets that have been supportive of him for years and years, have turned on this issue and are Some of the criticism is so scathing that it threatens the core elements of domestic political support for him. So I agree with you.
I think it's inconceivable that he will knuckle to pressure, even from Donald Trump at this point. So this is an example, yet one more example, when Iran and the United States are in a contest of wills.
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Chapter 6: How has Ukraine enhanced its military capabilities against Russia?
The Iranians are saying to the United States, you rein in your guy. But the answer back from the United States is, yeah, but our guy's not firing first. It's your guy that's firing first. You rein in your guy. This is what we've seen since the 28th of February when the war broke out. The Iranians, as you said, feel empowered now.
If they hold up, if they hold up any participation in the next stage of technical talks, nothing in that MOU moves forward, except U.S. One thing has already happened. the U.S. has ordered the lifting of the blockade.
Yeah. I've got a theory on that that I want to get to in a second just to wrap up this, the first half of the show. But before we get there, I'm enjoying this, playing through this 3D chess with you. So Iran would know that Benjamin Netanyahu could not allow himself to be constrained through U.S. leverage applied indirectly by Iran vis-a-vis the threat of
Chapter 7: What risks does Putin face as Ukraine escalates its attacks?
of, I guess, spiking all or key elements of the MOU. So what is Iran expecting Israel's reaction to be? And then is it not, Janice, running a risk here that it's going to have to escalate more directly with Israel as it did in the past, where most recently threatening and then acting on ballistic missile attacks into Israel on the basis not of Israel attacking Iran, but Israel attacking Lebanon.
asserting in that instance, what was that, a week or 10 days ago, that this would somehow be part of a new, almost strategic doctrine on Iran's part. I mean, they didn't go as fully to commit themselves to that, but Janice, it seems like, is that where this is headed, that Iran is testing and pressuring a new kind of doctrine, which is any direct attacks on our proxies, in this case, Hezbollah,
will warrant a direct strike on Israel by Iran?
Yeah. Look, first of all, right here, you know, in the decades of research I've done about how leaders understand the situation, they often get it wrong or we wouldn't have the wars that we have. It's entirely possible that Iran is right now miscalculating. Yes.
that's possible and he's reading donald trump's weakness and capacity on the one hand and overestimating his capacity to reign in israel that's probably the most likely thing it's feeling empowered you know one of the one of the experts on iran nate swanson just had a really interesting piece in which he said iran could lose this peace if it overestimates its own strength so
That's big risk, number one. If in fact that's what they're trying to do, we will see the ceasefire break out. This MOU will not last because even inside the United States, it would be very difficult for this administration to, in the wake of a ballistic missile attack against Israel by Iran, to stand by and to urge the Israelis not to respond.
That is what Trump did 10, what that was, a week or 10 days ago. That's exactly what he did. Yeah.
But that, what he did, you're absolutely right, he did.
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Chapter 8: How does the current geopolitical landscape affect global oil prices?
But he did that because a ceasefire was imminent. And he said to the Israelis, look, you are at risk of spooking the ceasefire proposal. That's one word. But when the ceasefire is already in place, And the Iranians would use ballistic missiles. That would be seen as the disruptor of the ceasefire, frankly. So this is a moment. This is one of these moments you watch for. The Iranians understand.
yes, they have come out of this more powerful than they went into it, but do they understand the limits of their power?
Yeah, they're certainly flexing right now. So just to wrap up this section of the show, let me try a theory on you. As you know, I'm a fan of Occam's razor. The simplest answer is usually the right one. And I wonder with all this back and forth the last 72 hours about the 14-point deal, the minutia of each and every point and the language contained within it,
Maybe what we're missing is something simpler, which is that there was one particular thing that both the United States and Iran wanted for different reasons, which was the reopening of the Straits of Hormuz. Iran wanted it because, as you've mentioned, I think with great insight, the Iranian economy is probably in worse shape than we understand.
Certainly, the lack of information coming out of Iran, I think, has probably allowed them to to cover up to a certain degree the profound collapse in their economy, the extent to which their oil capacity had hit the top of their tanks and was at risk of permanently damaging their wells and oil infrastructure. So the Iranians had an interest in getting the Straits open.
And summer driving season is arriving in the United States in a matter of two weeks. And there's something symbolic about a $4 gallon of gas. In US politics, that usually represents the proverbial Hangman's News.
So what if, Janice, we just took everything away, cleared the decks, and just understood that there was a clear alignment, a short-term alignment of interests, not around the nuclear program, certainly not around Iran's ballistic capacity, nothing to do with the proxies, nothing to do with regime change, human rights. maybe even nothing to do ultimately with Iran's position vis-a-vis Israel.
What this was and is is a short-term alignment of 30 to 60 to 90 days to clear out the straits, to release the choke point and its effects on the United States politically and on Iran economically. So the ceasefire will hold
the MOU will hold as long as the two parties are each getting their specific benefit from the reopening of the Straits of Hormuz and nothing is going to happen on the nuclear file. Nothing is going to happen on this $300 billion reconstruction fund. Yes, some funds will be released by Qatar as a symbolic gesture in terms of frozen sanctions.
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