4DCA Division 1 Oral Argument - 2026/09/17 - Sep 17, 2026

argument

4DCA Division 1 Oral Argument - 2026/09/17

California Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One 1h 45m 1 chapter transcribed 3 days ago official recording ↗

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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.

Lily 1:19

Good afternoon. This is Lily from the clerk's office. I'll be taking a roll call of those of you who are appearing remotely. Can you please unmute your microphone and turn on your video? And when you hear your name, please state your presence.

Lily 1:38

Dylan Carp

Dylan Carp 1:40

President.

Lily 1:41

Thank you. Your volume is a little low. I know.

Dylan Carp 1:47

Is that any better?

Lily 1:48

Yes, it is. Thank you.

Dylan Carp 1:50

Thank you.

Lily 1:51

Edward Kim

Dylan Carp 1:52

Present.

Lily 1:53

Present, thank you. And Stephen Haskins.

Unknown 1:56

Here.

Lily 1:57

Thank you. The court asks that you keep your microphone muted and camera off until we call your case. As a reminder, the proceedings are live streamed on the court's website. If you experience any technical issues during the session, you can immediately call in using the phone number and access code that's on your Zoom link. Thank you, we'll be with you shortly and the first case will be Butler versus Lazy Park in California.

Unknown 9:32

Yeah.

Unknown 9:49

Oh, is there? Okay. Yeah. Okay, we're changing. No. Much anything. But I'm the same piece. Well you're

Unknown 10:12

The first case will be butler versus lazy party helping. Some castle can come set up already stone.

Unknown 10:27

They're a respondent supplement's table plan. Okay.

Unknown 10:39

Okay, if I adjust the lecturer, thank you.

Unknown 11:18

Mm.

Unknown 20:45

All right. Porque a Bill State of California, Coca-Cola District Division One, Townsend Marvel Southville is that You can see it. Thank you. Good afternoon, everyone. I'm joined on this panel with Justice Castillo on my right and Justice Rubin on my left. The first matter we will hear is Butler versus uh LAZ parking. And we have counsel for appellant. Remote?

Dylan Carp 21:14

Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Unknown 21:16

Good afternoon, um, Mr. Carp. How much of your fifteen minutes would you like to reserve for a reply?

Dylan Carp 21:23

Three minutes, please.

Unknown 21:24

All right, thank you. Um you may proceed and if you could give us your full name for the record first.

Dylan Carp 21:29

Presiding Justice Doe, may it please the court. This is Dylan Carp for the appellant LAZ parking. And I'd like to start with the disposition that we're requesting. We're asking that the court reverse with directions either to grant our motion to compel outright or at least to reconsider the issue of severance. And here's how I get there. First of all, it's undisputed that there's only a low procedural a low only low procedural unconscionability. So if you agree with us that the only substantively unconscionable term is the attorney's fee provision, then as a matter of law, that provision should be severed because it's collateral to the main purpose of the contract and the rest of the arbitration agreement enforced under Roman versus Superior Court.

Dylan Carp 22:15

If however the court concludes that there are more than one More one excuse me, one or more additional substantively unconscionable provisions, then the disposition should be to reverse and remain with directions at least to reconsider the severance issue. And that's because Butler essentially concedes that the trial court erred on the most important issue of substantive unconscionability when it wrongly held that only Butler has the duty to arbitrate, but my client has the duty. has no duty to arbitrate anything. That's wrong. Under Roman And Ramirez versus Charter Communications, the arbitration agreement at the very least may be read so that both parties have the duty to arbitrate and therefore must be given that reading to ensure it's enforceable.

Dylan Carp 23:01

And the problem that raises for the severance issue if there are multiple substantively unconscionable terms, is that the trial court's error on that fundamental point infected its analysis of severance because the paramount consideration And assessing conscionability is mutuality. That's the Alberto at page four hundred ninety two. So it's unclear how the trial court would have ruled on severance but for its error on that fundamental point on mutuality. And for that reason, reversal to reconsider severance would be appropriate under Ramirez at pages five hundred seventeen to five hundred eighteen. As to substantive unconscionability, I also want to address the Rule eight point two five four notice that my friend on the other side filed on Monday about the Kluck versus GEO case, because the two reasons why kluck is distinguishable are the two reasons why the trial court erred in holding that our agreements contain an unconscionable carve out from arbitration.