4DCA Division 3 Oral Argument - 2025/11/20 - Nov 20, 2025

argument

4DCA Division 3 Oral Argument - 2025/11/20

California Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three 1h 18m 1 speaker 6 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the public‑disclosure bar and why does it matter in this fraud case?

Unknown 0:00

that led to this litigation, but there's no allegation of fraud within that article. I think what the confusion comes down to is the distinction between a qualifying public disclosure under a key TAM statute and a public document. A public disclosure under a Ketam statute is a term of art. It refers specifically to a publicly filed document, a specific type of publicly filed document, which is listed in the statute, that either explicitly alleges fraud or discloses facts from which fraud can be inferred. The other side has failed to identify any specific document that specifically alleges fraud or discloses facts from which fraud could be inferred. The purpose of the public disclosure bar is to prevent relators from filing lawsuits that merely copy allegations that exist in the public domain.

Unknown 0:56

So if there is no qualifying public disclosure that alleges the fraud, then there's nothing to copy. So our allegations here do not copy anything that is in the public domain. The allegations primarily come from appellant's personal observations, that were not disseminated, and so it cannot possibly just echo allegations that would qualify as a public disclosure. And because there are no qualifying public disclosures, there's no need to get into an original source analysis. But even if there were, Appellant is certainly the original source of her own observations, which she never publicly disseminated. So that would be our position on the public disclosure bar. And unless there are any questions, I'll move on to collateral estoppel.

Unknown 1:46

With respect to collateral estoppel, our position is quite simple. We're dealing with different parties here. The relator or the people of the State of California were not parties to the previous litigation, and that's a fundamental element of collateral estoppel. So without that, collateral estoppel cannot be applied. And from a policy standpoint, it would be quite dangerous to have the adjudication of a civil lawsuit between an insurer and insured preclude the government from prosecuting a future fraud claim. So that would be another reason not to apply collateral stopover. Other than

Martha Gooding 2:28

that – What is your response, counsel, to the privity argument that Ms. Hengler is in privity? with or should be deemed to be in privity with GEICO? MR.

Unknown 2:41

Well, in GEICO, the issue was whether there was a delay in providing insurance benefits. The issues here are entirely different. This is whether there was an act of insurance fraud. That was not the issue that was litigated in the bad faith litigation. So the plaintiffs stand in an entirely different position than GEICO did in the prior litigation. Unless there are any further questions, I will submit. None? I don't hear any. Thank you. Thank you to all counsel.

Joseph Ginola 3:15

Thank

Unknown 3:15

you. The case is submitted. Clinton v. Amazon Logistics.

Lucas Townsend 3:59

Good afternoon, Your Honors. My name is Lucas Townsend. I represent the Amazon Appellants, and I would like to reserve three minutes.

Unknown 4:07

Very well. Let me proceed. Thank you.

Lucas Townsend 4:10

The Supreme Court has held what it means for a class of workers to be engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FAA's exemption in Section 1. Any exempt worker must at least play a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders. The workers here are individuals who sign up through an app to make local deliveries using their personal vehicles. Most deliveries are food and groceries. The deliveries are multiple steps from any movement of goods across borders. The individuals are not carrying goods across borders, they are not dispatching goods across borders, nor are they receiving goods across borders. Therefore, they are not playing a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders.

Lucas Townsend 4:59

The Superior Court and the plaintiffs err in contending otherwise. The Superior Court applied an erroneous stream of interstate commerce standard based on Ninth Circuit precedent that predated the Supreme Court's most recent Section 1 holdings. That standard focused on the wrong thing. It focused on the goods rather than on the work being performed.