4DCA Division 3 Oral Argument - 2026/04/21 - Apr 21, 2026

argument

4DCA Division 3 Oral Argument - 2026/04/21

California Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three 2h 27m 1 speaker 8 chapters transcribed 9 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the purpose of the opening oral argument in the California Fourth District Court of Appeal?

Unknown 0:41

Mm. Mm-hmm. Just decide things at the same time.

Unknown 1:52

Yeah, questions, sir. Oh, just reading yes.

Unknown 2:59

So so you won't be able to I guess.

Unknown 5:57

All right. Court of appeal, Fourth of Cal District, the Ministry is now a section.

Unknown 6:08

Good morning everyone, welcome. We have two panels this morning, one matter each. Um I am Justice Motuike, to my right is Justice Sanchez and to my left is Justice Delaney. First matter we'll call us in remarriage of Amuretashami.

Unknown 6:42

Whenever a pound's ready. Thank you, Your Honor.

William M. Holsey 7:04

Yeah, please the court. Um I represent uh the appellant and the respondent of the family law matter, John Amir Tishami. The standard of review

Unknown 7:15

Council, can we get your appearance?

William M. Holsey 7:16

Oh I'm sorry. My my name is William M. Holsey, H U L S Y. Thank you.

Unknown 7:24

And Mr. Holsey, um just before you start, I noticed that you reserved fifteen minutes. Would you like to reserve any of that portion for a reply?

William M. Holsey 7:31

Um maybe five minutes, Your Honor.

Unknown 7:33

Thank you.

William M. Holsey 7:37

Um, I represent uh the appellant and the respondent in the family law matter, John Amir Tishami. The standard of review. uh that we're applying here today. We believe. uh regarding asset characterization, valuation and allocation is substantial evidence. Here we believe that the court should reverse the award of one hundred percent of Miss Amir Tishami's two defined benefit pension plans as substantial evidence does not award. uh s support such an award under family code section twenty six. O two. Um, because the court did not make a Any analysis of the extent of any s sort of misappropriation or harm that Miss Mir Tishami Received. Um we filed a motion to augment um It included an August sixteenth, twenty twenty four reconsideration of attended ruling.

William M. Holsey 8:49

My client was pro per. It's in our in our Yeah it's Not particularly well done. However, uh he did raise the issue of the one hundred percent allocation and two different spots in that reconsideration. Um I believe that uh one of the issues that are going to be presented here today. Um is that uh the court is not bound by the single recovery doctrine. Um our position is is that the single recovery doctrine um means that Miss Amir Tishami can only recover once for a single harm. uh that any sort of case law that argues or supports a double compensation for a single harm um we don't think is warranted by the record. Um Finally, uh there is the issue of Mr. Amir Tashami's uh questioning of the adequacy of the statement of decision.

William M. Holsey 10:05

And we would point out that California Code of Civil Procedure, Section six thirty four, is keyed towards omissions and ambiguities, not necessarily pointing out An inconsistency, and Mr. Amir Tashami did that. I have nothing further.

Unknown 10:27

Yes. Uh respondent can only recover once for a single harm. Can you expound on that a little bit? Why do you think that didn't happen?

William M. Holsey 10:39

Well the the court imposed uh sanctions for breach of fiduciary duty. And then in addition She also said that she was going to go under twenty family code section twenty six oh two. And then Awarded one hundred percent of the two defined benefit pension plans and if the court will recall the facts of the matter were not in dispute. that Mr. Amir Tishami um at the beginning of the marriage had been a long term uh teacher. He worked for only two years during the length of the marriage. Um he subsequently cashed out his Um Meanwhile, Mrs. Mirtishami Work. Two jobs with two different pensions. Uh the whole length of the marriage. And It's Yes, they are both pensions. But it be the equivalent of one party taking a partially separate, partially separate older model car and selling it and then awarding the Ferrari to the other party simply because they were both cars.

William M. Holsey 12:06

It's just uh simply It's inequitable on its face. But the court under twenty six oh two would have been allowed to do that. But she needs to identify the extent of the harm she In how the twenty six oh two compensates for the harm. In this particular situation. There was no analysis in that regard. It was just He cashed out of pension so she gets one hundred percent of the two, even though they were distinctly different in value on community property.