Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. (16-1220)
argument 16-1220Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co.
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
official recording ↗
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What is the central question about a district court’s obligation to accept foreign sovereign statements of law?
argument next in case 16-12-20, animal science products versus Haby Welcome Pharmaceutical. Mr. Gottlieb.
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The question in this case is whether a district court is bound to accept a foreign sovereign statement of foreign law in the unusual case in which the Court has concerns about the statement's clarity, its completeness, or its consistency. The answer to that question is no. District courts have the authority to to resolve their concerns by considering any relevant materials, even if they go beyond the materials presented by the sovereign. On the motion to dismiss in this case, the District Court found that the amicus brief that was submitted by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce failed to answer important questions about how its vitamin C regulations applied to the specific agreements that were identified in the complaint.
It also found that the Ministry's interpretation appeared to be at odds with the regulations that it cited and the documentary evidence before the Court. The Second Circuit held that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss the case at the motion to dismiss stage. And the panel's view was based entirely on its view that the Ministry's appearance deprived the District Court of discretion to answer its questions about the Ministry's position by proceeding to discovery.
May I ask you a question about your bottom line? You say that the Court of Appeals should be reversed. But if you're right that the Court of Appeals should not have taken what the Chinese ministry said as conclusive, then wouldn't the proper bottom line be a vacate and remand so that Second Circuit can reassess with the understanding that what the ministry said is not conclusive?
We do think that vacating or remanding would be an appropriate disposition. However, as we've pointed out in our brief, the Second Circuit, in footnote 10 of its opinion, described what the district court had done as completely and reasonably appropriate in its treatment of the evidence at the motion to dismiss stage and on summary judgment stage. The Second Circuit's opinion was simply that the district court had erred and abused its discretion in in failing to allow the case to move forward to discovery. The District Court or the Court of Appeals hadn't even ruled on, for example, the appropriate complaint. The Court of Appeals construed the second amended complaint as opposed to the third amended complaint, which was before the District Court on its motion for summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals did not challenge in any way the District Court's construction and interpretation of Chinese law that occurred in its summary judgment opinion. And for that reason, we think that under taking just the terms of footnote 10 of the Court of Appeals opinion, the proper disposition would be to reverse, but we certainly accept that vacating or remanding would be an appropriate disposition as well. We think that there are significant costs to the rule that the Second Circuit has adopted. One of those costs is the independence of the judiciary to decide questions that are before them. U.S. courts should not give up their responsibility to say what the law is in cases and controversies before them, even when that law is foreign.
And courts in this country have been interpreting and construing foreign law for two centuries and not outsourcing that task to other entities simply because those questions are difficult. The integrity of the judicial process relies upon courts
— we give conclusive weight to a determination by an agency as to what the law is. So why, as a matter of comedy, wouldn't we do the same to an administrative agency of a foreign sovereign?
There's a number of reasons, the first of which is that the Chevron Doctrine has a number of sort of gatekeeping steps or preconditions before this Court would even consider the reasonableness of an agency's interpretation. And so, for example, Chevron Step 0 and Step 1 are
All that suggests is perhaps we should import a similar regime here.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central question about a district court’s obligation to accept foreign sovereign statements of law?
0:00–9:18
2
How do district courts resolve doubts about the clarity or completeness of foreign‑law statements?
9:18–18:02
3
Why does the Second Circuit’s deference standard to the Chinese Ministry’s interpretation cause controversy?
18:02–24:50
4
What is the difference between “reasonable interpretation” and “respectful deference” to foreign governments?
24:50–31:23
5
How should U.S. courts evaluate the authority and consistency of a foreign sovereign’s submission?
31:23–37:50
6
Do other nations or international conventions follow a similar binding‑deference rule for foreign law?
37:50–45:58
7
What are the practical implications of the price‑fixing regime at issue for antitrust analysis?
45:58–52:57
8
What ultimate holding does the Supreme Court reach on the deference standard for foreign sovereign statements?
52:57–1:00:32