Apple Inc. v. Pepper (17-204)
argument 17-204Apple Inc. v. Pepper
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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What is the core damages theory behind the Apple‑Pepper antitrust case?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case seventeen two oh four, apple versus
pepper. Mr Wall. Thank you, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The only damages theory in this monopolisation action is rooted in a thirty percent commission. that Apple charges app developers, and which allegedly causes those developers to increase app prices to consumers. The case is barred by the Court's Illinois BRIC doctrine because the developer's pricing decisions are necessarily in the causal chain that links the Commission to any consumer damages. If the Commission increases beyond the competitive level, But app's developers do not change their app's prices. Consumers suffer no damages. And if app developers do change their prices to pass on some or all of the overcharge, Well, that is precisely the kind of damages theory that the Illinois BRIC Doctrine prohibits.
Is there any In in your view, is there any first spire in this picture?
Excuse me.
Is there any first fire in this picture?
Uh well there's there's two different buyers in this picture. There are the app developers who, by contract with Apple, are um buying a package of services which include distribution and software, intellectual property and testing and and so forth. And then the plaintiffs in this case are the the buyer of the apps themselves that are made with that package of goods and services and
Is there in this case anyone who would qualify as a first buyer uh the standing to sue Apple.
The developers. Yes, w without a doubt. The developers are the ones who, in the first instance, pay the thirty percent commission. I think it's it is it is important to root the analysis in the common ground which has been conceded that the only damages theory is based upon that thirty percent commission. That is charged by contract between Apple and the developers, and it is deducted from whatever price that the developer chooses to to set, subject to only the minimal restrictions.
The customer. It's the customer who pays the thirty percent.
But there has always been a a transaction between Apple and the developer before that, which r has the pricing decision of what the developer is going to do on account of the thirty percent commission.
That was a case of a vertical monopoly. Um Concrete blocks. person manufacturer. uh monopolises the next intermediate market who then sells to a customer.
Yes.
All right. This is not quite like that. This is dramatically different. This is a closed loop.
It is a closed loop, but in terms of the injury theory, which is what is at issue. No, they're crazy.
doesn't have to be thirty percent. They're not seeking thirty percent of their sales. They have to go out and prove at the next step. how without this monopoly they would have paid less. It could be as little as a m d a penny or nothing, or it could be something more. But The point is that this closed loop With Apple as it spoke. They are the first purchaser of that thirty percent markup.
No, th they are not. The first purchaser is clearly the app developer, who by contract agrees that every time it puts a positive price on an app, um it will allow Apple to to take thirty percent of it. Apple collects the the the funds, but even the Ninth Circuit here agreed that that the process, the the payment flow is immaterial to the Illinois brick issue.
Certainly I wouldn't think that's true, even if they concluded it. It's a simple theory. I would have thought it would have been an antitrust for at least a hundred years. What you do is you look to see who you claim is the monopolist. Who do they claim is the monopolist? Apple. Apple. And if you pay more if that's true. Bacon. Raise prices to some people. Lower them to others, their suppliers? And if you are injured because you paid them more, the monopolists, You can collect damages. And if you're injured because they forced your price down, you're a supplier. you can collect damages. End of theory. I don't see anything. in Illinois brick. It conflicts with that?
Everything in the Illinois Brick conflicts with that. The the emphasis in all three of this Court's decision on both pass on defenses and damages theories.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the core damages theory behind the Apple‑Pepper antitrust case?
0:00–6:07
2
How does the Illinois Brick doctrine affect standing for app developers and consumers?
6:07–13:57
3
Who qualifies as the “first purchaser” in the Apple‑App Store transaction chain?
13:57–21:35
4
Why do the parties argue that Apple’s 30 % commission is a monopoly overcharge?
21:35–29:48
5
What is the significance of the “closed‑loop” pricing model for proximate‑cause analysis?
29:48–36:53
6
How do the justices differentiate between vertical supply‑chain cases and the Apple scenario?
36:53–43:34
7
What hypothetical pricing examples illustrate the potential consumer injury?
43:34–51:43
8
How might damages be calculated and allocated between developers and iPhone owners?
51:43–1:00:09