Arellano v. McDonough (21-432)

argument 21-432

Arellano v. McDonough

Supreme Court of the United States 47 min 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the Irwin presumption and how does it apply to the one‑year deadline in 51‑10‑B‑1?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument next in case twenty one four thirty two. Arriano

Mr. Barney 0:06

versus McDonough. Mr Barney. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. When service disabled veterans are discharged uh from the military, they have one year under fifty one ten B one to file a claim for retroactive disability compensation. This deadline operates like a statute of limitations by encouraging service disabled veterans to promptly apply for for retroactive benefits or else lose that right forever. The Irwin presumption in favor of equitable tolling applies to this one year deadline because it is a non jurisdictional claims processing rule set forth in a statute for which Congress has waived sovereign immunity. Now the Secretary attempts to rebut the Irwin presumption by characterizing Section fifty one ten as a general rule subject to multiple exceptions, but that does not rebut the presumption.

Mr. Barney 0:56

First, none of the other subsections the Secretary points to relate to service connected disability compensation, which is the sole focus of fifty one ten B one. For example, the Secretary relies heavily on subsection B four, but that sets a deadline for disability pensions, a different type of benefit passed by a different Congress at a different time. Other subsections set forth deadlines for debt dependency benefits, death benefits, and death pensions, none of which have any nexus to fifty one ten B one. Not one of those other deadlines would be rendered superfluous by the application of equitable tolling to fifty one ten B one. So this is not a situation where the deadline in question already includes an an exception, an express exception, that would be swallowed by the application of equitable tolling.

Mr. Barney 1:42

Here there are zero express exceptions to the one year deadline of fifty one ten B one. Finally, even if we accept the Secretary's argument that Congress provided equitable exceptions elsewhere in fifty one hundred ten, that only strengthens the Irwin presumption for fifty one ten B one. Because unlike in those other subsections, Congress chose to remain silent for fifty-one ten B one, which is exactly what we would expect Congress to do if they if it wanted the general rule of equitable tolling to apply. And with that I welcome the Court's questions.

John G. Roberts 2:13

Uh Council, I think it was um W wise of you to be mentioned B four in your opening because I think that's the biggest hurdle you've got to uh uh get over. That is a situation uh where Congress specifically addressed tolling in a case of disability preventing a a timely filing. Now you say, well, that was only for uh disability pensions. It had nothing to do in your case as of course service connected. But it you know, at least they were addressing that particular issue, and it seems odd to me to have express Um uh I don't know what it's tolling, right, in in in the one provision. But another one, which is the same sort of thing, the same question, does disability prevent you from filing, not have not have that there.

John G. Roberts 3:01

Um I just y I guess I'd like an uh uh you to expand a little further on the answer you gave just a moment

Mr. Barney 3:08

ago. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. As you noted, B4 does not apply to the same type of benefit that is at issue here. It is important to understand that 5110 includes what I would just call a grab bag of different types of benefits that have been codified over the years into 5110. They were passed by different Congresses at different times, and B-4 is a perfect example. That particular benefit comes from the 1970s and doesn't have any nexus to the the benefit that appears in subsection B one, which dates back to at least nineteen fifty eight. Um So uh first of all, there are different there are different benefits. Uh with respect to what presumption or what inference should we draw from the fact that Congress saw fit to include some sort of equitable exception in B four, uh the inference really should be the opposite of what of what you just suggested.

Mr. Barney 3:56

If Congress saw fit to in nineteen seventy three to include this equitable exception for disability pensions, which again are enti an entirely different type of benefit.