Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn (09-987)
argument 09-987Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the Arizona tuition tax credit program and why is it being challenged?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case zero nine nine eight seven, Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization versus WIN and the related case Garriot versus Wynn. General?
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. For thirteen years, Arizona has permitted private citizens to contribute money to private organizations set up by private individuals, and has let those organizations use that money to award scholarships when individuals apply for them. The Ninth Circuit aired first in finding that the taxpayer plaintiffs had standing and second in striking the program down. On standing This lawsuit bails each of the three necessary elements. Regarding injury, in fact, the key point is this not a cent of the respondents' money goes to fund religion. If you placed an electronic tag to track and monitor each cent that the respondent plaintiffs pay in tax, not a cent, not a fraction of a cent would go into any religious school's coffers.
Their point is that this tax money does belong to the State that the private individuals are using, because it is money that even by the new amendment, says either you pay it to the State Or you use it for this purpose. But it's the state's money and it's giving you by its largesse the right to redirect it. That's their argument. Right. So it would be the taxpayers' tax dollars being spent on religion if they could sustain their
claim. There there are two problems with that. One has to do with injury in fact, the other has to do with redressability. With respect to injury in fact, our point is as you track the taxpayers' dollars It doesn't actually fund any religious program, unlike FLAST and other cases in which this court is considered taxpayer standing for religion. Their complaint is not that the government is spending money that the taxpayers has been money that has been extracted and spent of the taxpayers. Their complaint is that someone else's money is not being extracted and spent enough. And the relevant language in FLAST says that for taxpayer standing to occur, it quote, his tax money must be extracted and spent.
And here that's not occurring. Now, with respect to the other argument, which not injury and fact, but redressability and causation, our point is this. It is speculative as to whether or not that chain of events that you spelled out, Justice Sodemeyer, would actually happen. As this court said in CUNO, for example, when a tax credit is given, sometimes that actually reduces the amount of money the government has to spend. It doesn't increase it. And so that's different than the direct outlay that was at issue in FLAS.
Then is it constitutional if we get a new system? Here is what the system will be. The taxpayers who are religious will be able to check a box and the check that they send to the IRS, uh it's a possible system. What happens is that that check is cashed uh by uh an official and the cash is given to the local priest to say prayers uh for the individual who contributed the money. And in your view, there is no one who could challenge that.
Well let me say two things about that. First is that is not all that different, Justice Breyer, than what we have today with five oh one C three deduction.
The difference is, of course, that in the one case it is a deduction, and in this case you are paying it a hundred percent with money that would otherwise go into the coffer.
I
understand that, but I am interested in conceptually, does the government think that there is no one who could challenge that?
Uh I don't think that any taxpayer could challenge that. That is, depending on the hypothetical, Justice Breyer, I am not sure if the government is specifying which religious organizations might be eligible for the checked box. But if the government is doing something that is under-inclusive and only giving tax credits to one set of religious organizations, that is a Texas monthly property. So
if in go back into history. Uh it could have been the case that the uh as long as they were fair to every religion, the first Congress could have funded prayers throughout the nation in churches for anyone to uh go and pray, uh and that would not have violated the establishment clause.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Arizona tuition tax credit program and why is it being challenged?
0:01–8:11
2
How does the Court evaluate taxpayer standing in this case?
8:11–16:25
3
What is the difference between a tax credit and a tax deduction for charitable contributions?
16:25–25:53
4
Why might the tax‑credit scheme violate the Establishment Clause?
25:53–33:12
5
How does the Zelleman voucher case compare to Arizona’s tuition‑credit program?
33:12–39:33
6
Who are the actual beneficiaries of the program – parents, schools, or the State?
39:33–45:37
7
What constitutional problems arise if STOs discriminate based on religion?
45:37–52:45
8
What is the Court’s final position on the constitutionality of Arizona’s tuition‑credit system?
52:45–1:01:06