Artis v. District of Columbia (16-460)

argument 16-460

Artis v. District of Columbia

Supreme Court of the United States 52 min 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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What does the statute say about the period of limitations being “told”?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument this morning, case sixteen four sixty,

Unknown 0:03

Artists versus the District of Columbia. Mr. Romikowski. Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, Title twenty eight, Section thirteen sixty seven D specifies that the period of limitations on a supplemental jurisdiction claim shall be told while the claim is pending in federal court and for a period of thirty days after it is dismissed. The question before the Court this morning is, what does it mean for a period of limitations to be told? The court should hold that told means suspended, an interpretation that accords with the plain meaning of the word told. That is the definition given in Black's Law Dictionary, and that is the way told is used in every other statute that uses the word told, none of which would make any sense under respondents' interpretation.

Unknown 0:48

If that's the way the statute operates, it seems to me that the provision at the end which says the state can provide for a longer tolling period is generally un unnecessary if the If the as it's as on and under your position. Um it would seem to be quite unnecessary for the state to have a longer tolling period. Your Honor States could be it it could be, of course, that they're concerned about there being only a week left or something, but in in most cases Um Uh and and under your view, I just don't see the necessity for the last clause. Your Honor, it's true that typically the State Savings Clause won't necessarily be triggered, but there are certainly many sets of facts in which it would be triggered.

Unknown 1:29

First of all, a state could enact a tolling period that's even longer than the Federal tolling period. Louisiana, for instance, actually restarts the clock. But they couldn't enact a shorter one. It could not that's correct. I think this is a fairly good. In other words, your your your position gives the states zero flexibility. The respondents give the states maximum flexibility. States can have it when any way they want, but you don't give any protection. To the states that don't want to have long delayed suits. Yeah. That is it is certainly the case that this statute provides a federal floor, and we're debating about the length of the federal floor, and we believe that the federal floor is longer than respondents do, and the effect of that is that it's true that under our position, the state tolling uh the the savings clause will be triggered less frequently under our view.

Unknown 2:10

But that's simply the necessary implication of the plain text of the statute in our view. uh thirteen sixty seven D refers to the thirty day period as a tolling period too, but that period is recognized as a grace period, the th the thirty day add on. that the the the federal statute It types that as a tolling period, but it isn't, is it? Your Honor, the way we interpret the statute is that the clock stops while the claim is pinning in federal court and for thirty days after it's dismissed. So we understand the phrase tolling period to refer to the the period during which the the clock stops. So we view that thirty days as part of the tolling period.

Samuel A. Alito 2:56

But does does toll and uh do toll and tolling mean the same thing?

Unknown 3:02

I I think that in the context of this particular statute, toll means suspended. So I I think that it's true that in general, when you know there are for instance the Charton case says that in general the word toll can carry different types of meanings, but I think that we have to look at the words of this particular statute as to

Samuel A. Alito 3:16

Yeah, well let's look at the words of this particular statute. Unless State law provides for a longer tolling period, so does that refer only to those State statutes that suspend the period, or does it also include those State statutes that simply stop the clock?

Unknown 3:35

So, Your Honor, I think that's a a d debatable proposition. The position we took in our reply brief is that if a state grace period statute would produce the arithmetic equivalent of a longer tolling period than the Federal statute, then that does qualify as a longer tolling period.