Astrue v. Capato (11-159)
argument 11-159Astrue v. Capato
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What is the Social Security Administration’s interpretation of the term “child” under the Social Security Act?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case eleven one hundred fifty nine, Astru versus Capato.
Mr. Miller? Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the Social Security Administration has reasonably interpreted the Social Security Act. To provide that as a general rule, a person seeking to establish eligibility for child survivor benefits must show that he or she would have been able to inherit personal property from the decedent under applicable state and testacy law. That interpretation is supported by the text, structure and history of the Act. And it comports with principles of federalism because it defers to state law on the determination of family status, which is a traditional subject of state regulation. It's reasonable and entitled to deference under chevron. Now the textual arguments in this case involve the interaction of three provisions of the Act.
The first is Section 402 D one, which is the basic benefits granting provision, and that says that under certain conditions the child of a wage earner uh is entitled to benefits, and that provision has a cross reference to a definition of child in section four hundred sixteen E of the Act. Four sixteen E. which is reprinted at page four A of the appendix to our brief. Um says that the the term child means one the child or legally adopted child of an individual, two, a stepchild under certain cases, and three, a person who is the grandchild or stepgrandchild of an individual. Now I think the one thing that's immediately apparent from looking at that provision is that under anyone's reading it's a little bit confusing because it uses the word child twice to mean two different things.
That is the first child. i is broader than the second because the first one includes the second, uh as well as uh adopted child, stepchild, and so forth.
Suppose the state legislature got the crazy idea that Children born to married people during the the time of the marriage shouldn't inherit under state intestacy law. Would that mean that they would be ineligible for survivors' benefits?
Not necessarily because uh uh uh i i if somebody doesn't qualify under a and I should say at the outset that that is uh unlike the law uh of any state either in nineteen thirty nine or today. Uh but what
if they did what if they did that?
Um Th there there are two alternative mechanisms that Congress added to the statute uh in the nineteen sixties to allow children who lack intestacy rights uh to establish their eligibility. Those are four sixteen H uh two B and four sixteen H three. Uh and four hundred sixteen H three says that an applicant who is the son or daughter uh of an insured individual but is not a child under uh under paragraph. A, which is the reference to state intestacy law, uh shall nevertheless be deemed to be a child uh if there was an acknowledgement in writing uh that the child was uh that the applicant was uh the son or daughter, or there was a court decree for support. Um
with uh children whose parents are not married. W
that that's right. And the the reason for that is that in fact, uh under the law of every state, both in nineteen thirty nine and today, uh children whose parents are married uh do have state uh do have intestacy rights. But I I I think what what the provision I I just referred to illustrates uh is that the term child in the statute is a legal term of art. Uh because if you were just looking at the ordinary meaning of the word child, the concept of an applicant who is a son or daughter uh but is not a child uh would be completely nonsensical.
Maybe it means uh that to the Congress that initially enacted the predecessor of this provision, a child was a child. They knew what a child was. And the uh type of child that I mentioned earlier was a child. There wasn't n need for any definition of that. And they they never had uh any inkling about the situation that has arisen in this case, just as they had no inkling that any state would go off and take away uh intestacy rights for Children born to married people during the course of their marriage.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Social Security Administration’s interpretation of the term “child” under the Social Security Act?
0:01–9:34
2
How does the statute’s definition of “child” create confusion with its dual use of the word?
9:34–18:11
3
Why did Congress include Sections 416 H 1 B and 416 H 3 as alternative mechanisms for children lacking intestacy rights?
18:11–26:08
4
How does the Court view the relationship between state intestacy law and the federal definition of child?
26:08–32:47
5
What is the purpose of Section 416 H and how does it interact with Section 416 E?
32:47–40:00
6
How would children conceived through assisted reproductive technology be treated under the statute?
40:00–46:04
7
Does the statute’s language require a plain‑meaning reading that limits benefits to natural children of married parents?
46:04–52:53
8
What are the implications of the Court’s analysis for future cases involving post‑humous conception and non‑marital births?
52:53–1:00:56