Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Court for Western Dist. Tex. (12-929)

argument 12-929

Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Court for Western Dist. Tex.

Supreme Court of the United States 59 min 5 speakers 4 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗
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What is the Supreme Court’s opening argument about enforcing forum‑selection clauses?

John G. Roberts 0:02
We'll hear argument next this morning in case twelve nine twenty nine Atlantic Marine Construction Company versus the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Mr. Hastings?
Unknown 0:13
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court, forum selection clauses have been frequently used in contracts of all types. They should be enforced as written. And the enforcement of a contractual form selection clause should not just be left to convenience, discretionary balancing tests. Rule twelve B three in Section fourteen oh six of the United States Code provide appropriate and effective means for enforcing a contractual form selection clause. The language of those provisions is written broadly. Congress used words like wrong and the rule uses the word improper, which have plain and natural meanings that are broad. And are sufficient to authorize district courts to act to enforce the contractual clause.
Unknown 0:59
To say that a form selection clause is a venue provision? I thought venue was something that the Congress determined. Uh Your Honor, the cases do discuss it as a venue provision. One example would be this Court's decision and Stewart addressed a form selection clause in a fourteen oh four A transfer analysis, which is clearly a venue analysis. In addition to that, with the twenty eleven amendments to the uh United States uh code Congress adopted a definition of venue. It's in section thirteen ninety. That definition says the place of litigation. I'm paraphrasing it but it's it's a pretty straightforward definition. The legislative history of Section two hundred one of that act acknowledges that the definition was intended to make venue determinations easier and to make it clearer that parties could waive or adjust these types of provisions even by contract.
Unknown 1:49
The work in this
Samuel A. Alito 1:50
contract. In the Stewart case to which you just referred, the court said Quote The parties do not dispute that the District Court properly denied the motion to dismiss the case for improper venue under fourteen oh six A because respondent apparently does business in the Northern District of Alabama, which was not the jurisdiction specified in the forum selection clause. So what if we were to write an opinion in your favor, what would you suggest we say about that?
Unknown 2:16
Your Honor, I believe the correct reading of that language is what the the Second Circuit has said in the trade comment decision and others have written on this. that Stewart, in in the text right by that footnote, that's footnote eight, I believe, the text right there said the immediate issue is how we address fourteen oh four A. And the way the majority of the circuit courts have read it is the issue in Stewart, this procedural issue that we're here on today was just simply not presented to the court. And so the court could very easily write a decision that acknowledges Stuart still controls on a fourteen oh four A analysis, but acknowledged that, like the majority of the circuits, that Stuart simply did not have to address this problem.
Samuel A. Alito 2:54
Well that's true that's true, but it means that the entire discussion and Stuart is beside the point. The court wrote a decision about an issue that really never should arise because the party seeking as you see it, the party seeking to enforce the form selection clause should proceed under 1406. So Stewart said, well, if if you proceed under the wrong provision, this is how it should come out. It it makes the whole decision essentially meaningless, doesn't
Unknown 3:22
it? Uh, Justice Leto, I I respectfully disagree. And here's what the meaning of Stuart would be as as we understand it. First of all, under the facts of Stuart, the same situation would arise, of course, if a party waived their proper venue objection. That may be a narrow line of cases, but that would still apply in a case where a party doesn't assert the contract at first. But there's another place where Stewart would still apply. When a case is filed in the proper jurisdiction, here if this lawsuit had been filed in Virginia, there would be a very limited place or exceptional circumstances for a court to look at a 1404A analysis and determine if public interest required something other than the contract clause.

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